Friends, Gangbangers, Custody Disputants, Lend Me Your Passwords by Orenstein, Aviva
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
2012
Friends, Gangbangers, Custody Disputants, Lend
Me Your Passwords
Aviva Orenstein
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, aorenste@indiana.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Evidence Commons, and the Internet Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Orenstein, Aviva, "Friends, Gangbangers, Custody Disputants, Lend Me Your Passwords" (2012). Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper
770.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/770
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2041466
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MSL\31-2\MSL201.txt unknown Seq: 1 24-OCT-12 15:35
FRIENDS, GANGBANGERS, CUSTODY DISPUTANTS,
LEND ME YOUR PASSWORDS
Aviva Orenstein*
I. INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186 R
II. WHAT IS SOCIAL MEDIA? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187 R
III. WHY DOES SOCIAL MEDIA MATTER FOR EVIDENCE LAW? . 191 R
A. Social Media’s Relevance to Litigation Issues Other
than Admission of Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 R
B. Social Media’s Relevance to Litigation Issues Involving
the Admission of Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192 R
IV. HEARSAY AND THE INTRODUCTION OF SOCIAL MEDIA . . . . . . 194 R
A. Statements Admitted Not for Their Truth but for Another
Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194 R
B. Parties’ Statements Offered by Party Opponents . . . . . . . . . . 195 R
C. Prior Consistent Statements of Witnesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196 R
D. State of Mind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197 R
E. Present Sense Impressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198 R
F. Excited Utterances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 R
G. Recorded Recollections—But Not Business Records . . . . . . 199 R
H. Dying Declarations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 R
I. Declarations Against Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200 R
J. Forfeiture of Hearsay Right . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200 R
K. The Residual Hearsay Exception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201 R
L. The Confrontation Clause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201 R
V. AUTHENTICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202 R
A. Authentication Generally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202 R
B. Photographs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204 R
C. Authenticating Posts, Updates, and Tweets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207 R
1. The Stricter Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208 R
2. A More Liberal Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212 R
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law Bloomington.  I would like to thank
Alexandra Block, Jason Howard, and Heather Shreve for outstanding research assistance.  I dedicate
this Article to my son, Michael  M. Greenberg, who allows me to friend him on Facebook.
185
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2041466
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MSL\31-2\MSL201.txt unknown Seq: 2 24-OCT-12 15:35
186 MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [VOL. 31:185
3. Potential Analogues to Authenticating Social
Media—Authenticating Other Types of Evidence . . . . 215 R
4. Which Approach is Better? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217 R
a. Page Ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218 R
b. Concerns About Creating a Fake Page . . . . . . . . . . 219 R
c. Concerns About Hacking or Opportunistic
Signing on to Someone Else’s Page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220 R
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221 R
I. INTRODUCTION
Whenever parties seek to introduce out-of-court statements, eviden-
tiary issues of hearsay and authentication will arise.  As methods of com-
munication expand, the Federal Rules of Evidence must necessarily keep
pace.  The Rules remain essentially the same, but their application varies
with new modes of communication.  Evidence law has been very adaptable
in some ways and notoriously conservative, even stodgy, in others.  Al-
though statements on Facebook and other social media raise some interest-
ing questions concerning the hearsay rule and its exceptions, there has
been little concern about applying the hearsay doctrine to such forms of
communication.  By contrast, such new media have triggered what could be
characterized as a judicial “freak-out” concerning how to authenticate
statements made via social media.
Part II of this Article defines and explains the function of social media,
and Part III discusses where evidence from social media currently appears
in modern trials.  (The short answer is: everywhere.)
Part IV discusses hearsay questions raised by statements on Facebook
and Twitter, arguing that, with some small exceptions, the Rules are per-
fectly well-suited to deal with such new media and that courts face few
problems in doing so.
Part V documents the divergent approaches courts have taken to au-
thenticating evidence from social media.  Although some argue that the
capacity for false authorship and fraud is so great that new rules are neces-
sary, the majority of scholars and practitioners believe that the current
rules of authentication are adequate, though there is much disagreement
about their application.  After setting out the evidence standard for au-
thentication and the various approaches of recent cases, Part V criticizes
the overly cautious and restrictive approach of some courts.
Part VI advocates for the more open approach to authenticating social
media adopted by some courts.  It goes further, arguing for a rebuttable
presumption of authenticity barring credible evidence of appropriation or
hacking.  As with other types of technology when first introduced—photo-
graphs, telephone calls, x-rays—an inevitable transition period exists as
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courts gradually become familiar with the new mode of transmitting infor-
mation and less fearful of undetectable fraud.  In the meantime, it is satisfy-
ing to reflect how the Federal Rules of Evidence, properly applied,
continue to be an excellent source for accommodating new and sometimes
challenging forms of out-of-court communication.
II. WHAT IS SOCIAL MEDIA?
Hundreds of millions of people worldwide use social media.
Wikipedia, which itself is a form of social media, describes social media as
follows: “Social media includes web-based and mobile technologies used to
turn communication into interactive dialogue.”1  Of particular interest in
evidence law are social networking sites that provide online platforms for
people to interact.2  Users adopt a screen name and establish an online
identity, forming links with friends they know in the real world or strangers
who share similar interests.3  Users can create and edit written content,
post photographs, join groups, post on the pages of friends, and engage in
one-on-one electronic conversations,4 all in real-time with a timestamp.
The content can be original or can be replicated from other sources.5
1. Social Media, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_media (last visited June 24,
2012). See JOHN G. BROWNING, THE LAWYER’S GUIDE TO SOCIAL NETWORKING: UNDERSTANDING
SOCIAL MEDIA’S IMPACT ON THE LAW 17 (2010) (“‘Social media,’ also known as ‘social networking,’ is
the term used to describe any type of social interaction using technology (primarily the Internet, but
also including modern smartphone and PDA innovations) with some combination of words, photos,
video, and/or audio.”).  Such media has surpassed e-mail as the preferred formed of electronic commu-
nication.  Breanne M. Democko, Social Media and the Rules on Authentication, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 367,
367 (2012).
2. “[Social network sites are] web-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public
or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share
a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the
system.”  James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1142 (2009) (quoting Danah
M. Boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and Scholarship, 13(1) J. COM-
PUTER-MEDIATED COMM. art. 11 (2007)), available at http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol13/issue1/boyd.ellison.
html). See Megan Uncel, “Facebook Is Now Friends with the Court”: Current Federal Rules And Social
Media Evidence, 52 JURIMETRICS J. 43, 46–47 (2011) (“Social networking websites are defined by three
main functions: first, users create their profile; second, users create and display a list of other users ‘with
whom they share a connection’ and content; lastly, users browse ‘their list of connections and those
made by others.’ ”) (citations omitted).
3. Social online networking sites allow members to “use their online profiles to become part of
an online community of people with common interests.  Once a member has created a profile, she can
extend ‘friend invitations’ to other members and communicate with her friends over the MySpace.com
platform via e-mail, instant messaging, or blogs.”  Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 846 (W.D.
Tex. 2007).
4. It is possible to chat privately with individuals and to send private messages on Facebook.
See Facebook Features, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Facebook_features (last visited June 24,
2012); Grimmelmann, supra note 2, at 1145 (explaining some of Facebook’s features, including “a pri-
vate, email-like ‘Message’ system”); Uncel, supra note 2, at 48–49 (providing a detailed explanation of
the many communication features of Facebook and Myspace); People v. Fielding, No. C062022, 2010
WL 2473344, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. June 18, 2010) (“MySpace comments posted to an account can be read
by anybody viewing that page, but MySpace messages are similar to e-mails and are exchanged pri-
vately between ‘friends’ through MySpace.”) (emphasis in original).
5. Therefore, a posting to which Facebook friends have access can be reposted, and the original
poster can lose control of who has access to the information.
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Currently, Facebook has over 900 million active users,6 more than half
of whom check their pages daily.7  Users register and create a personal
profile using their actual names.8  Designated “friends” receive feeds of the
user’s posts and status updates.9  Such posts can be about politics, upcom-
ing events, or simply the banality and minutiae of everyday life.  Status
updates can be boring,10 wry,11 poignant,12 mildly amusing,13 or incendi-
ary.14  Accumulation of “friends” and “likes” (where users share contents
from pages they designate and share postings with their “friends”)15 can
6. Facebook, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Facebook (last visited June 24, 2012).
Facebook  has been described recently by the Maryland Supreme Court as “the behemoth of the social
networking world.”  Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 421 n.9 (Md. 2011).
7. Facebook Statistics, Stats & Facts for 2011, DIGITAL BUZZ BLOG (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.
digitalbuzzblog.com/facebook-statistics-stats-facts-2011/.
8. See Gresham v. City of Atlanta, No. 1:10-CV-1301-RWS-ECS, 2011 WL 4601022, at *2 n.3
(N.D. Ga. Aug. 29, 2011) (“Facebook is an internet based social networking site that allows individuals
to maintain profiles of themselves, in which comments, photographs, and other postings may be made
to certain other persons also subscribed to Facebook.”); Ira P. Robbins, Writings on the Wall: The Need
for an Authorship-Centric Approach To The Authentication Of Social-Networking Evidence, 13 MINN. J.
L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 7 (2012) (“Facebook explicitly requires members to use their real names when
creating profiles, but many other social-networking sites, such as MySpace, actually encourage the crea-
tion of pseudonymous accounts . . . .”); Andrew C. Payne, Twitigation: Old Rules in a New World, 49
WASHBURN L.J. 841, 846–47 (2010) (“Facebook members can share text with multiple people through a
‘status update’ or through information placed on the user’s profile . . . . Users can also share text with
another user individually through a direct message to the user or a wall post to the user’s profile, or
users can have a direct conversation with another user through Facebook’s chat feature.  Social-
networking patrons can also share pictures and videos.  A user’s ‘news feed’ displays all the information
that his or her friends create, change, or share.”).
9. The average user on Facebook has 120 friends. See Sheryl Stanberg, How Many Friends Can
You Have?, FACEBOOK BLOG (Apr. 8, 2009, 4:23 PM), http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=72975
227130.  However, the limit is 5,000. See Aimee Lee Ball, Are 5,001 Facebook Friends One Friend Too
Many?, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/30/fashion/30FACEBOOK.html?
_r=1.
10. E.g., “I like carrots, but not cooked carrots.” Boring Status Updates, FACEBOOK, http://www.
facebook.com/pages/Boring-Status-Updates/100530216664201 (last visited June 24, 2012) (consciously
attempting to be boring).  Another boring Facebook trend is people posting about their breakfasts. See
Trollable, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=188083927976152&set=a.11318100879
9778.14420.&type=1&theater (last visited June 24, 2012).
11. E.g., “What good is it to have awesome pictures of burqas, pose with war junk, or wax ironic
about pictures taken with celebs if Expat Aid Workers can’t share those pictures with the world?” #16
Facebook, STUFF EXPAT AID WORKERS LIKE (Jan. 24, 2011), http://stuffexpataidworkerslike.com/2011/
01/24/16-facebook/.
12. One can, with a special application, update Facebook friends about one’s own death, sharing
last words and video.  Released once three approved trustees report the death, the status will be post-
humously updated with the user’s auto-epitaph. See Melanie Hick, Who Will Update Your Facebook
Status if You Die?, HUFFINGTON POST U.K. (Jan. 9, 2012, 12:55 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/
2012/01/09/i-die-facebook-app_n_1193443.html (mocking the application).
13. E.g., “Statistically, 6 out of 7 dwarfs aren’t happy.” 50 Funny Facebook Status Ideas, RYAN
KETT HUB PAGES, http://ryankett.hubpages.com/hub/50-Funny-Facebook-Status-Ideas (last visited
Apr. 1, 2012); Top 100 Status Updates, FUNNY STATUS, http://www.funnystatus.com/status-updates/top-
100-status-updates/ (last visited June 24, 2012) (“Artificial intelligence is no match for natural
stupidity.”).
14. E.g., “[I]f the fetus whose life you save turns out to be gay, will you still fight for its rights?”
Best Facebook Statuses, TUMBLR, http://bestfbstatuses.tumblr.com/ (last visited June 24, 2012).
15. See Like Button, FACEBOOK DEVELOPERS, http://developers.facebook.com/docs/reference/
plugins/like/ (last visited June 24, 2012).
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affect social status and business advertising.16  It is possible to “unfriend” a
fellow Facebook user, a term that was recognized by the Oxford American
Dictionary as the word of the year in 2009.17  Unlike blogs or YouTube
videos, where the creator of content has little control over who ultimately
reads or watches it, social networking sites provide users with the option of
controlling the initial dissemination of their posted information.18  The
user’s homepage has privacy levels that he or she can adjust regarding who
has access to the user’s page,19 though for evidentiary purposes, the privacy
settings are meaningless—they have no influence on issues of admissibility.
Other prominent social networking providers include MySpace, which
operates similarly to Facebook and focuses heavily on music and popular
culture,20 and LinkedIn, which is a more professional, less social version of
networking.21  In a variation of other social networking sites, another web-
site, Twitter, is “a real-time information network” connecting followers to
brief information bites.22  Twitter communications are denominated
“tweets,” which are “small bursts of information” 140 characters long.23
16. There is a market for gathering “likes” by businesses to establish credibility and advertise
their services. See, e.g., SOCIAL FAN HUB, http://www.socialfanhub.com/ (last visited June 24, 2012)
(offering businesses “likes” by individual Facebook users).
17. “Unfriend” the Word of the Year, CBS NEWS (Nov. 16, 2009, 8:08 PM), http://www.cbsnews.
com/2100-201_162-5673974.html (quoting Oxford lexicographer Christine Lindberg as saying “un-
friend” has ‘real lex-appeal’ ” for reflecting the mood of the year). But see Rick Moriarity, It’s
‘Defriend’ not ‘Unfriend’ Says Facebook Co-founder Chris Hughes before Syracuse Lecture, POST-STAN-
DARD (Nov. 17, 2009, 8:30 PM), http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2009/11/its_defriend_not_un-
friend_says.html.
18. See Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 438 n.3 (Md. 2009) (defining social
networking sites as “sophisticated tools of communication where the user voluntarily provides informa-
tion that the user wants to share with others” and distinguishing various privacy controls).
19. Sharing and Finding You on Facebook, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/
your-info-on-fb (last visited June 24, 2012).
20. MySpace is a popular social networking website that “allows its members to create online
‘profiles,’ which are individual web pages on which members post photographs, videos, and information
about their lives and interests.”  Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 845 (W.D. Tex. 2007).
United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 453 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“MySpace is a ‘social networking’ website
where members can create ‘profiles’ and interact with other members.  Anyone with Internet access can
go onto the MySpace website and view content which is open to the general public such as a music area,
video section, and members’ profiles, which are not set as ‘private.’ However, to create a profile, upload
and display photographs, communicate with persons on the site, write ‘blogs,’ and/or utilize other ser-
vices or applications on the MySpace website, one must be a ‘member.’ Anyone can become a member
of MySpace at no charge so long as he or she meets a minimum age requirement and register.”) (cita-
tions omitted).
21. See About Us, LINKEDIN, http://press.linkedin.com/about (last visited June 24, 2012)
(“LinkedIn operates the world’s largest professional network on the Internet with more than 161 mil-
lion members in over 200 countries and territories.”).
22. See About, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/about (last visited June 24, 2012) (“Twitter is a real-
time information network that connects [its users] to the latest stories, ideas, opinions and news about
what you find interesting.”).  In April 2009, Twitter, “the new kid on the social networking block,” had
over 14 million users.  Sharon Nelson, John Simek & Jason Foltin, The Legal Implications of Social
Networking, 22 REGENT U.L. REV. 1, 1 (2009-2010).  In 2011, Twitter claimed 175 million registered
users of whom about 119 million actually regularly follow at least one account.  Nicholas Carlson, How
Many Users Does Twitter REALLY Have? (March 31, 2011), http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-
03-31/tech/30049251_1_twitter-accounts-active-twitter-user-simple-answer.
23. About, supra note 22. See also Ascentive, L.L.C. v. Op. Corp., 842 F. Supp. 2d 450, 456 n.6
(E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Twitter is a social networking service that allows its users to post messages using
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All these media can be accessed not only on a regular computer, but also
on tablets and cell phones.24  Evidence is growing that social media, partic-
ularly Twitter, is addictive.25
Twitter and Facebook have been excoriated for derogating the quality
of communication, increasing isolation,26 and fostering cyberbullying.  They
have also been lauded for their roles in bringing people together, most no-
tably in aiding the Arab Spring, allowing revolutionaries to broadcast sto-
ries and disseminate pictures as events unfolded.27  Wherever one stands
on the benefits of these new social media, their effects on American culture
are marked.
Because caselaw necessarily lags behind technological advances, many
of the cases involve MySpace, which is on the wane, and fewer involve
Facebook, which is currently the social media leader and has grown expo-
nentially.28  The real next big thing, however, looks to be Twitter, which
courts have barely considered.
short communications called ‘tweets,’ and to read the tweets of other users. Users can, among other
things, monitor, or ‘follow,’ other users’ tweets.”).
24. See Apps, SMS, and Mobile, TWITTER, http://support.twitter.com/groups/34-apps-sms-and-
mobile (last visited June 24, 2012).
25. See James Meikle, Twitter is Harder to Resist than Cigarettes and Alcohol, Study Finds,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 3, 2012, 5:37 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/feb/03/twitter-resist-
cigarettes-alcohol-study; Patrick Garratt, My Life as a Twitter Addict and Why it is More Difficult to
Quit than Drugs, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 29, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/patrick-garratt/
twitter-addictions-more-difficult-to-quit-than-drugs_b_1305760.html (“[W]e’ve seen the internet
revolutionise the way we interact with one another, with Facebook emerging as the global connectivity
poster boy, but nothing else matches the pure buzz of Twitter.”); Larry Carlat, Confessions of a Tweeter,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes/2011/11/13/magazine/confessions-of-a-tweeter.html?_r
=1 (detailing the author’s loss of jobs and relationships due to his Twitter compulsion).
26. Stephen Marchie, Is Facebook Making Us Lonely, ATLANTIC MAGAZINE (May 2012), http://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/05/is-facebook-making-us-lonely/8930/ (our “web of con-
nections ha[ve] grown broader but shallower”).
27. See William Seltan, Springtime for Twitter: Is the Internet Driving the Revolutions of the Arab
Spring?, SLATE (July 18, 2011, 8:34 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2011/
07/springtime_for_twitter.html (noting that the “little” technologies such as cell phones are crucial in
avoiding repression, though totalitarian regimes also used the Internet to foster repression).  “[S]ocial
media can be helpful in:  a) mobilizing protesters rapidly; b) undermining a regime’s legitimacy; or c)
increasing national and international exposure to a regime’s atrocities.” Twitter, Facebook and You-
Tube’s Role in Arab Spring (Middle East Uprisings), SOC. CAP. BLOG (May 23, 2012), http://social
capital.wordpress.com/2011/01/26/twitter-facebook-and-youtubes-role-in-tunisia-uprising/ (last visited
June 24, 2012). But see Malcolm Gladwell, Small Change: Why the Revolution will not be Tweeted, NEW
YORKER (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/04/101004fa_fact_gladwell (argu-
ing that the effect of social networking on true change was overstated and the nature of strong ties
needed to foment revolution couldn’t be accomplished via relatively anonymous social media).
28. See John S. Wilson, MySpace, Your Space, or Our Space? New Frontiers in Electronic Evi-
dence, 86 OR. L. REV. 1201, 1221–24 (2007) (reviewing the history of social networking sites).
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III. WHY DOES SOCIAL MEDIA MATTER FOR EVIDENCE LAW?
A. Social Media’s Relevance to Litigation Issues Other than Admission
of Evidence
The social media revolution affects many areas of litigation other than
evidence law.29  For instance, attorneys use social media to check out po-
tential jurors during voir dire.30  Similarly, attorneys may investigate poten-
tial witnesses on Facebook to learn about them, to anticipate problems with
cross-examination, or to begin to craft ways to impeach them.  An interest-
ing question of ethics has arisen concerning whether attorneys may instruct
private investigators to “friend” witnesses without disclosing their motives
and association with the litigation.31
Social media is a major factor in juror misconduct during trial and de-
liberation.32  Juror misbehavior on the Internet, either by gathering outside
information in contravention of the judge’s instructions or by posting confi-
dential juror information or opinions mid-trial, occurs with increasing
frequency.33
29. Beth C. Boggs & Misty L. Edwards, Does What Happens on Facebook Stay on Facebook?
Discovery, Admissibility, Ethics, and Social Media, 98 ILL. B.J. 366, 367 (“As the popularity of social
networking sites like Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, and MySpace grows, so does their importance in
litigation.  More and more attorneys use these rich archives of personal information to investigate the
backgrounds of parties, witnesses, opposing counsel, jurors, and even judges.”).
30. This is the subject of fantastical novels such as John Grisham’s The Runaway Juror. See
Publishers Weekly, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/The-Runaway-Jury-John-Grisham/dp/04402214
71 (last visited Aug. 20, 2012) (“The details of jury selection are fascinating and the armies of lawyerly
hangers-on and overpaid consultants that surround such potentially profitable (to either side) cases are
horribly convincing.”).
31. See PHILA. BAR ASS’N PROF’L GUIDANCE COMM., Op. 2009–02 (March 2009), available at
http://www.philadelphiabar.org/WebObjects/PBAReadOnly.woa/Contents/WebServerResources/CMS
Resources/Opinion_2009-2.pdf (advising that directing an investigator to become a Facebook friend
with a non-party witness would be unethical, even if the investigator used his real name); BROWNING,
supra note 1, at 155–59.
32. See, e.g., State v. Dellinger, 696 S.E.2d 38 (W. Va. 2010) (juror communicated with accused
on MySpace); Dimas-Martinez v. State, No. CR 11-5, 2011 WL 6091330 (Ark. Dec. 8, 2011) (juror
continued tweeting after court admonished him to desist).  Colorado Civil Jury Instruction 1.5 provides,
in relevant part, “Until I tell you that your jury service is completed, do not communicate with anyone,
including family and friends, about the evidence or the issues in this case.  This prohibition applies to all
forms of communication . . . . For example, you must not communicate about this case by email, text
messages, Twitter, blogging, or social media like Facebook.”  State v. Abdi, No. 2010-255, 2012 WL
231555, ¶ 25 n.3 (Vt. Jan. 26, 2012) (quoting the jury instruction).  Nelson, Simek, & Foltin, supra note
22, at 7 (discussing an Oregon court instruction that includes the admonition, “[D]o not use any elec-
tronic device or media, such as the telephone, a cell or smart phone, Blackberry, PDA, computer, the
Internet, any Internet service, any text or instant messaging service, any Internet chat room, blog, or
website such as Facebook, My[ ]Space, YouTube or Twitter, to communicate to anyone any information
about this case until I accept your verdict.”). See generally John W. Clark, Andrea Wierzchowski, &
Chelsea Luker, Social Networking and the Contemporary Juror, 47 CRIM. L. BULL. 83 (2011).
33. See generally Michelle Sherman, The Anatomy of a Trial with Social Media and the Internet,
14 J. INTERNET L. 1 (2011) (discussing jurors who blog about the case or otherwise fail to follow courts’
limitations on social network use); David P. Goldstein, The Appearance of Impropriety and Jurors on
Social Networking Sites:  Rebooting the Way Courts Deal with Juror Misconduct, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 589 (recounting cases of jurors tweeting projected civil verdicts or polling friends by Facebook
as to guilt).
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In a very unusual Australian case—perhaps a sign of things to come—
a defendant with a default judgment against him was served with notice of
the default via his Facebook page, which he checked regularly.34
By far the most interesting and difficult questions pertaining to social
media outside the area of evidence law arise in discovery.  In civil cases,
courts are struggling with how a party can obtain evidence of an oppo-
nent’s social media output.  In criminal cases, issues of search and seizure
arise.  These questions are beyond the scope of this Article, which exam-
ines the admissibility of such social media, not how it is obtained.  Even
when not admissible, however, social media can provide significant rele-
vant information.35
B. Social Media’s Relevance to Litigation Issues Involving the
Admission of Evidence
Increasingly, evidentiary issues concerning the admission of social me-
dia arise in both civil and criminal cases.  It is not hard to see why parties
might value Facebook posts and tweets, which are often spontaneous, un-
censored, newsy, and self-revelatory.36  In fact, not consulting social media
for investigative and evidence purposes has been deemed by some as legal
malpractice.37  Furthermore, social media users may not realize how acces-
sible and public their information is.38
In one example that had less to do with the content of the speech than
the fact of having made it, an accused offered as an alibi that he could not
have committed the crime because at the time of the crime, he was logged
into his Facebook account posting updates to his page.39  The prosecution
accepted his argument as sufficient to drop the charges.40  More often,
however, it is the prosecution that wishes to introduce evidence about the
34. See Pamela Pengelley, Can Facebook Information Be Used in Court?, TURNERS TIPS (Apr. 8,
2009), http://turnerstips.wikidot.com/can-facebook-in-court; BROWNING, supra note 1, at 29–36 (chapter
entitled “Served Through Facebook” describing cases in Australia and the United Kingdom).
35. BROWNING, supra note 1, at 11 (“attorneys can find useful and sometimes startling informa-
tion on other parties, key witnesses and even their own clients”).
36. Deborah Jones Merritt, Social Media, The Sixth Amendment, and Restyling: Recent Develop-
ments in the Federal Law of Evidence, 28 TOURO L. REV. 27, 46 (2012) (“users of social media are
surprisingly indiscrete”); Seth P. Berman et al., Web 2.0: What’s Evidence Between “Friends”?, 53 B.B.J.
5, 6 (2009) (social networking sites “may record people’s thought processes and impressions in un-
guarded moments, exactly the sort of evidence that can be invaluable during litigation.”).
37. Nelson, Simek, & Foltin, supra note 22, at 14 (“It should now be a matter of professional
competence for attorneys to take the time to investigate social networking sites.”); See generally,
BROWNING, supra note 1.
38. BROWNING, supra note 1, at 48–49.  Nelson, Simek, & Foltin, supra note 22 (“Initially, very
few people used the privacy settings that were available to them.”).
39. See Joseph Goldstein, In Social Media Postings, a Trove for Investigators, N.Y TIMES (Mar. 2,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/03/nyregion/03facebook.html (discussing the case of Rodney
Bradford, whose posting about breakfast made from his father’s home in Manhattan exonerated him
from a charge of bank robbery in Brooklyn at the same time); BROWNING, supra note 1, at 108–110.
40. Goldstein, supra note 39.
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accused, including evidence where the accused boasts of her crime.41  Al-
ternatively, the prosecutor may wish to introduce a picture of the accused
from her Facebook page, toting weapons in violation of her parole.42  In
another variation, a party may wish to demonstrate that a witness was
threatened.43  Social media may be one method of criminal stalking or bul-
lying.44  Finally, social media can be important at sentencing to refute alle-
gations of remorse, such as the Facebook pictures of a drunk driver
partying with alcohol and making flip comments about being drunk post-
conviction.45
In civil cases, Facebook or other social media can provide evidence of
a tort, such as harassment or defamation.46  Social media postings can also
support the defense in various tort areas, most notably personal injury, sick
leave,47 and workers’ compensation.  A plaintiff who claims she is immobi-
lized or severely limited in her activities may provide substantive and im-
peachment evidence for the defense if she posts pictures of herself rock
climbing, bowling, or line dancing.48  The issues of admissibility are impor-
tant not just for evidentiary rulings at trial, but also for pre-trial summary
judgment motions, which must be supported by admissible evidence.49
41. See, e.g., In re Welfare of D.L.W., No. A11-1238, 2012 WL 171412, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan.
23, 2012) (bragging about fight on Facebook undermines self-defense and unfair prejudice of boast did
not outweigh probative value).  See also BROWNING, supra note 1, at 49–50 (discussing poachers who
posted about the endangered species they caught and ate before being imprisoned for the crime; bus
thief documented his joy-ride on YouTube).  One defense attorney lamented:
There is nothing worse than at sentencing to be confronted with your client’s MySpace page, complete
with statements showing a lack of remorse, inappropriate content or provocative pictures. Or, having a
client who feels compelled to use the Web to announce to the world about the stash of drugs that the
police didn’t find when they searched his home.
Robbins, supra note 8, at 15 (quoting Laurie Mason, Defense Attorneys Trolling the Net, Too, BUCKS
CNTY. COURIER TIMES (Aug. 23, 2008), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-1549445091.html).
42. State v. Cisz, No. 1 CA-CR 11-0244, 2011 WL 5964518, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2011).
See also State v. Felts, No. M2007-00945-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 2521663, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. June
24, 2008) (admitting picture of “defendant holding an SKS assault rifle” on his MySpace page, linking
him to the type of weapon used).
43. See State v. McWilliams, No. 2011-CA-00051, 2012 WL 554435, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 13,
2012) (“[A]t the dawn of the 21st century, there are a multitude of methods by which criminal threats
may be conveyed: phone, pager, e-mail, blog, Twitter, Facebook, and so forth.”); Griffin v. State, 995
A.2d 791, 795 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010), rev’d, 19 A.3d 415 (Md. 2011).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574 (D. Md. 2011) (finding federal anti-
stalking law unconstitutional as applied).
45. See Nelson, Simek, & Foltin, supra note 22, at 12 n.90 (citing Vesna Jaksic, Litigation Clues
Are Found on Facebook, NAT’L L.J. (Oct. 15, 2007), http://vesnajaksic.com/?page_id=35).
46. See, e.g., Gaston v. Facebook, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-00063-ST., 2012 WL 610005 (D. Or. Feb. 24,
2012); Boyd v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinist & Aerospace Workers, No. 11-2496, 2012 WL 78250 (D.N.J. Jan.
9, 2012); Tanner v. Ebbole, 88 So. 3d 856 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011).
47. Marianne White, Quebec Woman Alleges Sick Leave Benefits Cut Off Because of Facebook,
GINGER TOES (Nov. 19, 2009, 6:02 PM), http://gingertoes.wordpress.com/2009/11/20/quebec-woman-al-
leges-sick-leave-benefits-cut-off-because-of-facebook/.
48. Facebook Photos Fail to Undermine Victim’s Claim Against ICBC, VANCOUVER SUN (Sept.
30, 2009), http://www.canada.com/vancouversun/news/westcoastnews/story.html?id=5b189b7e-86d8-ab
25-5eaa2b62fa6b (recounting the case of a Vancouver woman who claimed that her injuries diminished
her enjoyment of dancing, hiking, and cycling, although photos from her Facebook profile showed her
cycling and hiking after her injury and probably diminished the award).
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 56. See Impact Mktg. Int’l, L.L.C. v. Big O Tires, L.L.C., No. 2:10-CV-01809-
RLH, 2012 WL 359914 (D. Nev. Feb. 2, 2012) (holding that trial court can only consider admissible
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Outside of tort law, family law presents another area of civil litigation
where evidence from social media is increasingly important.  When parents
engage in a heated custody battle, pictures and postings portraying
drunken, drug-related, or sexually inappropriate behavior could prove sig-
nificant.50  Similarly, where infidelity is an issue, social media can provide
evidence of cheating.51
IV. HEARSAY AND THE INTRODUCTION OF SOCIAL MEDIA
Because any statements made on social media are by definition out-of-
court, they will at least raise traditional hearsay concerns and, in criminal
cases, raise confrontation issues if the government wishes to use the out-of-
court statement against the accused and the declarant does not testify.  Any
statement on social media made outside the courtroom will trigger ques-
tions about hearsay, authentication (which is discussed in the next section),
and best evidence52 (which is not addressed in this Article because no in-
teresting or special questions arise from the context of social media).53
A. Statements Admitted Not for Their Truth but for Another Purpose
Not all out-of-court statements qualify as hearsay.  The Federal Rules
define hearsay as statements that are used to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.54  In other words, an out-of-court-statement is hearsay only if the
trier of fact is being asked to believe that the statement is true.  Where the
statement is not being offered for its truth but is being offered just to show
that it was uttered, the statement is not being offered for a hearsay pur-
pose.  When, for instance, the MySpace page of the accused was used to
show his gang nickname and paraphernalia, but not the assertions in the
evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment and therefore may not consider unauthenticated
documents); Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 538 (D. Md. 2007) (explaining the need
for admissible evidence in determining a summary judgment motion).
50. See Lalonde v. Lalonde, No. 2009-CA-002279-MR, 2011 WL 832465, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. Feb.
25, 2011) (factoring pictures on Facebook of the mother drinking in contravention of medical advice
into granting custody to the father); Dexter v. Dexter, No. 2006-P-0051, 2007 WL 1532084, at *6 (Ohio
Ct. App. May 25, 2007) (noting that in the mother’s MySpace writings, she stated that while she was on
a hiatus from using illicit drugs during the pendency of these proceedings, she planned on using drugs in
the future and would use them in her home if her daughter were sleeping); BROWNING, supra note 1, at
39–41 (recounting dissolution and custody cases where Facebook pages were introduced).
51. See Stephanie Chen, Divorce Attorneys Catching Cheaters on Facebook, CNN (June 01,
2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-06-01/tech/facebook.divorce.lawyers_1_privacy-settings-social-me-
dia-facebook?_s=PM:TECH.
52. The best evidence rule requires that when a party wishes to prove the contents of a docu-
ment, that party must present the document, when it is available, rather than merely solicit testimony
about it. See FED. R. EVID. 1002.  So, under the best evidence rule, a plaintiff wishing to offer evidence
of a defamatory statement made by the defendant on a Facebook page would have to bring in a copy of
the page itself.  Unless  issues arise concerning authentication or fairness, the best evidence rule accepts
a duplicate as well as an original. See FED. R. EVID. 1003.  Any printout of the page would be an
original. See FED. R. EVID. 1001.
53. See Jonathan L. Moore, Time for an Upgrade: Amending the Federal Rules of Evidence to
Address the Challenges of Electronically Stored Information in Civil Litigation, 50 JURIMETRICS J. 147,
148, 173–174 (2010) (noting that the majority of courts treat printouts of electronically stored mate-
rial—even if modified—as originals that satisfy the best evidence rule).
54. FED. R. EVID. 801(a)–(c).
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messages, the court explained that the accused’s “hearsay challenge is with-
out merit because the trial court did not admit the MySpace material for
the truth of any assertion on the page.”55  The court explained further that
the accused’s hearsay objection failed
because the nature of the evidence here did not consist of
declarative assertions to be assessed as truthful or untruth-
ful, but rather circumstantial evidence of [the accused]’s ac-
tive gang involvement.  For example, a reasonable jury
would understand its purpose was not to determine whether
[the accused] and his “Krew” were truly “Most Wanted” by
the “Ladiez” in Orange County.56
Classic examples of statements that are not hearsay because they are
being offered for a purpose other than their truth include circumstantial
evidence of state of mind, effect on the listener, statements offered for im-
peachment, and legally operative facts.  Some posts on social media will fall
into these categories.  On the issue of impeachment,57 for instance, to show
that a party was aware of an allegedly dangerous condition, warnings by
posters on his Facebook page could be admissible not to prove the danger-
ous condition but to demonstrate effect on the listener—that the party was
aware of them.  Although I could find no example using social media,
courts regularly allow evidence of notice on email to be introduced as
outside the hearsay bar.58  Statements of defamation, extortion, conspiracy,
or threat would all be legally operative facts and hence not fit within the
hearsay definition.  Statements on social media could also be used to re-
fresh the recollection of the declarant who is testifying.  Jogging the mem-
ory of a witness with a document is not a hearsay use.59
B. Parties’ Statements Offered by Party Opponents
Much of what might be offered at trial will, however, be introduced for
its truth and hence fit the classical definition of hearsay.  Even when a
statement is technically hearsay according to the common law definition,
some statements are deemed “not hearsay” under the Federal Rules be-
cause they fall within specified exemptions.60  The most useful exemption
for social media is statements by the parties themselves.  Anything a party
55. People v. Valdez, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 628, 634 (Ct. App. 2011).
56. Id.
57. In re K.W., 666 S.E.2d 490, 494 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that child victim’s statements
on her MySpace page were admissible for impeachment of her testimony, but that their exclusion was
harmless error).
58. See, e.g., X17, Inc. v. Lavanderia, No. CV06-7608-VBF(JCX), 2007 WL 790061 (C.D. Cal.
March 8, 2007).
59. FED. R. EVID. 612 (providing the rules concerning writings used to refresh a witness’s mem-
ory and requiring that the opposing party be able to view the refreshing document).
60. Here, I distinguish between exceptions that avowedly are hearsay but are nonetheless ex-
cepted from the hearsay ban, and exemptions that some rulemakers deem by fiat to be “not hearsay,”
but really are. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d).
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says or does (other than a criminal defendant who has not been Mirandized
but nevertheless makes statements to the police during a custodial interro-
gation)61 is exempted from the hearsay rule.62  Therefore, any relevant
statement a party posts on her Facebook page or tweets on her Twitter
account will be admissible notwithstanding the hearsay bar, if offered by
her party opponent.63  This huge exemption from hearsay affects much of
the evidence parties will attempt to introduce at trial, particularly in civil
cases.  The exemption applies not only to direct personal statements but
also to statements made by agents, employees, and co-conspirators.  In
State v. Greer,64 the Ohio appellate court held that the trial court did not
err in admitting the accused’s own statements from his MySpace page that
were offered by the government.  In a South Carolina case, an alleged bank
robber logged into his MySpace page to inform his followers: “On tha run
for robbin a bank Love all of yall.”65  That message was admissible.
C. Prior Consistent Statements of Witnesses
Sometimes a party will wish to introduce his own statement.  Just be-
cause the party testifies does not necessarily render his prior consistent
statements admissible.  When a party’s statement is offered by the party
himself and not the party opponent, a hearsay question arises.  Such state-
ments may fall within other exemptions or exceptions to the hearsay rule.
States vary significantly in their treatment of a witness’s prior consis-
tent statement (including that of a party).  Under certain circumstances, the
Federal Rules of Evidence allow such evidence both for common-law reha-
bilitation and for the truth of the matter asserted.66  The Rules limit the
substantive use of prior consistent statements of witnesses to situations
where the proponent wishes to rebut a charge that the declarant recently
fabricated his current testimony or acted from a recent improper motive or
influence.67  Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, to be admissible, the
prior statement must have been made after the alleged motive to fabricate
61. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (statements made by an accused in police custody
are admissible only if the accused received information about his right to counsel and right against self-
incrimination).
62. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
63. See. e.g., People v. Oyerinde, No. 298199, 2011 WL 5964613 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2011)
(admitting relevant Facebook posts by the accused).  This, of course, assumes that the statement
presents no other evidentiary problems such as providing impermissible character evidence under Rule
404 or being so unfairly prejudicial so as to substantially outweigh the probative value of the statement
under Rule 403.
64. 2009 WL 2574160 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2009). See also United States v. Sullivan, 2011 WL
4808118 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 11, 2011) (addressing statements made on an employee’s MySpace page, as
potential admissions by the accused).
65. See Goldstein, supra note 39.
66. I do not discuss prior inconsistent statements because such statements, when generated on
social media, do not fit the requirements of Rule 801(d)(1)(A), under which the prior inconsistent
statement has to be made under oath at a prior proceeding. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
67. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).
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arose.68  Essentially, for non-hearsay rehabilitation, the evidence is being
used to say, “You see, the witness has been saying this all along.”69  For its
substantive use, the theory is, “You see, the witness has said it all along, it’s
true, and you can use the witness’s prior consistent statement as evidence.”
D. State of Mind
One frequent use of statements on social media is to prove the state of
mind of the speaker.  Although hearsay, such statements are nevertheless
admissible for their truth because they fall under a special exception for the
declarant’s “then existing mental, emotional or physical condition.”70  The
exception covers statements relating to motive, intent, plan, and feelings,
both physical and emotional.71  The exception does not include statements
of memory or belief, so the memory of a feeling or the then-belief of a fact
is not covered by the exception.72
As the Court explained in the important and comprehensive analysis
of Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Company:
[G]iven the ubiquity of communications in electronic media
(e-mail, text messages, chat rooms, internet postings on
servers like “myspace” or “youtube” or on blogs, voice mail,
etc.), it is not surprising that many statements involving ob-
servations of events surrounding us, statements regarding
how we feel, our plans and motives, and our feelings (emo-
tional and physical) will be communicated in electronic
medium.73
For instance, the accused assaulter of Representative Gabrielle Gif-
ford posted a message on his MySpace page saying “Goodbye friends”
hours before he went on his shooting rampage.74  That post could help es-
tablish intent and could serve as evidence of premeditation.75  In People v.
Oyerinde, the trial court admitted Facebook page statements to demon-
strate the victim’s state of mind, but the appellate court indicated that the
evidence, though ultimately harmless error, should have been excluded as
facts remembered or believed.76
68. The Supreme Court held that 801(d)(1)(B) “permits the introduction of a declarant’s consis-
tent out-of-court statements to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive
only when those statements were made before the charged recent fabrication or improper influence or
motive.” Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 167 (1995).
69. See, e.g., State v. Neese, No. M2005-00752-CCA-R3-CD2006, 2006 WL 3831387 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Dec. 15, 2006) (allowing prior consistent statements of an abuse victim during a forensic interview
to rehabilitate the witness after insinuations of fabrication and coaching.)
70. FED. R. EVID. 803(3).
71. Id.
72. Id. (excluding “statement[s] of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed”).
73. 241 F.R.D. 534, 568–69 (D. Md. 2007).
74. See Goldstein, supra note 33. The statement would also be admissible as a statement by a
party-opponent under FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A).
75. Id.
76. People v. Oyerinde, No. 298199, 2011 WL 5964613 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2011).
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E. Present Sense Impressions
The present sense impression creates a hearsay exception for state-
ments “describing or explaining an event or condition, made while or im-
mediately after the declarant perceived it.”77  A statement such as, “My,
the sun is bright,” qualifies as a present sense impression because it was
made while the event was occurring, arguably before the declarant has the
time or presence of mind to conjure something untrue.78  Arguably, most
postings on Facebook and MySpace will not qualify because of the timing
requirement, since most posts are made sufficiently later than the time the
declarant perceived the event.79
Professor Jeffery Bellin has raised interesting questions about the pre-
sent sense impression with regard to Twitter.80  Because tweets are some-
times composed while the event is occurring, they seem to fit this hearsay
exception.  Status updates on Facebook and Google+ might also have com-
parable immediacy.  Bellin posits that the current exception was not de-
signed with social media in mind and that one guarantee of
trustworthiness—the presence of others who can testify not only to the
statement but also to the underlying event or condition—is noticeably ab-
sent when present-sense statements are communicated via Twitter.81
A traditional present sense impression uttered to fellow passengers,
such as, “That Ford pickup is weaving all over the road,” would have cor-
roborative witnesses—if not about the truck’s behavior, then about what
was happening with the declarant.  A tweet concerning the same occur-
rence would not.  Tweeting and other social media forms of concurrent up-
dating are  meant for public consumption and entertainment.  As one
compulsive tweeter explained: “When I wasn’t on Twitter, I would com-
pose faux aphorisms that I might use later.”82  The declarant expects to
communicate with a far-flung audience that cannot verify the truth of the
tweets.  Bellin is persuasive in arguing for the return of some sort of cor-
roboration requirement before tweets and analogous forms of immediate
social media communication are admitted as present sense impressions.
77. FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
78. The reliability of present sense impressions stems from:
(1) the report at the moment of the thing then seen, heard, etc., is safe from any error from
defect of memory of the declarant; (2) there is little or no time for a calculated misstatement;
and (3) the statement will usually be made to another (the witness who reports it) who would
have the equal opportunity to observe and hence to check a misstatement.
Eisenman v. State, No. 13-05-705-CR, 2008 WL 2515877, at *14 (Tex. App. Jan. 10, 2008) (citations
omitted).
79. But see United States v. Ferber, 966 F. Supp. 90 (D. Mass. 1997) (holding, in a mail/wire fraud
case, that an e-mail from an employee to their boss regarding the substance of a telephone call with the
defendant qualified as a present sense expression).
80. See Jeffrey Bellin, Facebook, Twitter, and the Uncertain Future of Present Sense Impressions,
160 U. PA. L. REV. 331 (2012).
81. Id. at 334–35.
82. Carlat, supra note 25.
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F. Excited Utterances
Another exception to the hearsay rule is the excited utterance, which
creates a hearsay exception for statements “relating to a startling event or
condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement” of
the precipitating condition.83  The theory of the exception is that under the
stress of the excitement, the declarant will not have the opportunity to con-
fabulate.84  Although there is a built-in timing requirement (the length of
time the declarant remains under stress), the time between the event and
the declaration is not as short as with the present sense impression.  Be-
cause the excited utterance requires a startling event that still holds the
declarant in its thrall, it is a poor fit with social media.  If a person is calm
enough to tweet or to update her Facebook status, then the effect of the
startling event has passed.
G. Recorded Recollections—But Not Business Records
Tweets and posts to Facebook do not qualify as business records.
Statements made by individuals for non-business purposes on social media
cannot qualify as business records.  They simply lack the business purpose
and routine practice of recording such business activity that the business
record rule requires.85  However, they may qualify as recorded recollec-
tions if (1) the declarant cannot fully remember the incident, (2) the writing
was made when the event was fresh in the declarant’s memory, and (3) the
writing accurately reflects the declarant’s knowledge.86  If a tweet or a
Facebook comment or update is admitted under the recorded recollection
exception, it is generally read into the record and may be received as an
exhibit only if offered by an adverse party.87
H. Dying Declarations
There is already sad evidence of suicide notes on Twitter and
Facebook.88  A post on social media could fit the requirements of a dying
declaration.  The declarant would have to be unavailable, the statement
would have to be made while the declarant believed he was dying, and it
83. FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
84. See Aviva Orenstein, “My God!”: A Feminist Critique of the Excited Utterance Exception to
the Hearsay Rule, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 159 (1997).
85. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
86. FED. R. EVID. 803(5).
87. Id.
88. See Woman Posted Suicide Note on Facebook, THESMOKINGGUN.COM (January 24, 2012),
http://www.thesmokinggun.com/documents/suicide-note-on-facebook-453129 (Suicide note, “i cant han-
dle this shit anymore,” barring her father from the funeral posted on Facebook immediately before
mother of three shot herself); Jakob Rodgers, Soldier Wrote Facebook Suicide Note Before Springs
Crash, COLORADO SPRINGS GAZETTE (Jan 7, 2012, 11:00 AM), http://www.gazette.com/articles/wrote-
131361-facebook-springs.html; Catharine Smith, Man Posts Suicide Note to Twitter, HUFFINGTON POST
(May 25, 2011 5:50 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/16/twitter-suicide-note-post_n_614956.
html. Cf. Lisa Belkin, Announcing a Child’s Death on Twitter, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2009, 12:26 PM),
http://parenting.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/17/tweeting-about-a-childs-death/.
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would have to concern the cause of death.89  Dying declarations have re-
cently attracted more attention because the Supreme Court has indicated
that they are a sui generis exception to the Confrontation Clause.90
I. Declarations Against Interest
A statement against interest is one that
a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would have
made only if the person believed it to be true because, when
made, it was so contrary to the declarant’s proprietary or
pecuniary interest or had so great a tendency to invalidate
the declarant’s claim against someone else or to expose the
declarant to civil or criminal liability . . . .91
To be admissible, the declarant must be unavailable92 and the state-
ment tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability must be corrobo-
rated by circumstances clearly indicating its trustworthiness.93  The
Supreme Court has explained that “only those declarations . . . that are
individually self-inculpatory” are admissible under Rule 804(b)(3).94
Whether a statement meets the interest criteria can only be judged in con-
text.95  The declaration must be consciously against interest at the time it
was made.  As of this writing, I could find no case admitting a statement on
social media via this exception.  In one case, evidence of a person’s salary
posed on MySpace was not admissible because although detrimental to her
custody case, it was not against interest at the time it was made.96  Courts
have admitted emails as statements against interest.97
J. Forfeiture of the Hearsay Right
Where a party intentionally renders a declarant unavailable, the de-
clarant’s statement may be admitted even if it is hearsay.98  This hearsay
89. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).  Under the Federal Rules, dying declarations may be offered in civil
and homicide cases. See Aviva Orenstein, Her Last Words: Dying Declaration and Modern Confronta-
tion Jurisprudence, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1141 (2010).
90. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.6 (2004) (noting in dicta that the dying decla-
ration may be “deviation” from the general rule confrontation rule); Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353,
358–59 (2008).
91. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)(A).
92. Sources of unavailability include incapacity, death, refusal on pain of contempt to testify, and
privilege. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a).
93. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)(B).  “A statement is admissible under this exception if:  (1) the
speaker is unavailable; (2) the statement is actually adverse to the speaker’s penal interest; and (3)
corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.”  United States v.
Smith, 383 F. App’x 355, 356 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
94. Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 599 (1994).
95. Id. at 604.
96. Musgrove v. Helms, Nos. 08CA96, 09CA76, 2011 WL 1225672, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. April 1,
2011).  It is unclear to me why the statement on MySpace was not a statement by a party opponent
under Rule 801(d)(2)(A).
97. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Sirianni, 334 F. App’x 386 (2d Cir. 2009).
98. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).
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exception is grounded in basic fairness.  If a party wrongfully caused or
acquiesced in making the declarant unavailable and intended to do so, then
the party cannot be heard to complain that the statement is hearsay.  As
with declarations against interest, the exception applies only if the declar-
ant is deemed unavailable.
K. The Residual Hearsay Exception
“To be admissible under Rule 807, the evidence must be (1) trustwor-
thy, (2) material, (3) more probative than other available evidence, and
must fulfill, (4) the interests of justice, and (5) notice.”99  Courts apply this
residual or catch-all exception “very rarely, and only in exceptional circum-
stances.”100  Rule 807 is used as a back-up argument or part of a laundry
list of exceptions when a court admits an out-of-court statement.  For in-
stance, one district court explained its ruling as follows: “The state-
ments . . . are likely admissible because they will not be offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted and even if they are, they fall within one or
more exceptions, specifically, the state of mind exception or the residual
exception.”101  Federal district courts have admitted emails under this rule,
but I have so far found no Facebook posts or other social-media material
admitted under the residual hearsay exception.102
L. The Confrontation Clause
In criminal matters, where a “testimonial statement” is offered against
the accused for its truth, the evidence will have to satisfy the Sixth Amend-
ment Confrontation Clause as interpreted by Crawford v. Washington.103
Crawford held that testimonial statements offered against the accused must
be subject to cross examination.104  If the declarant is proven unavailable,
then the prosecutor may use the testimonial statement only if the declarant
had a previous opportunity to confront the accused.105  The only exceptions
to the Crawford rule are dying declarations and forfeiture, where the ac-
cused has intentionally made the declarant unavailable.106
Hearsay exceptions that require unavailability (such as declarations
against interest) trigger a Crawford inquiry in criminal cases.  The compli-
cated and unresolved question concerns the extent to which statements are
“testimonial,” intended as a substitute for in-court testimony or at the very
99. Lasnick v. Morgan, No. 3:10-cv-345 (JCH), 2011 WL 6300159, at *2 (D. Conn. 2011) (quoting
Silverstein v. Chase, 260 F.3d 142, 149 (2d Cir. 2001)).
100. Parsons v. Honeywell, Inc., 929 F.2d 901, 907 (2d Cir.1991).
101. Fair Isaac Corp. v. Experian Info. Solutions Inc., No. 06-4112 ADM/JSM, 2009 WL 3526491,
at *1 (D. Minn. 2009).
102. See, e.g., Lasnick, 2011 WL 6300159. But see Steven Shipping & Terminal Co. v. Japan Rain-
bow, 334 F.3d 439 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that the district court did not err in admitting email corre-
spondence under rule 807); Mercer v. Csiky, No. 08-11443-BC, 2010 WL 3565811 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 13,
2010) (rejecting application of Rule 807 to email statements).
103. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
104. Id. at 68–69.
105. See PARK, LEONARD, ORENSTEIN & GOLDBERG, EVIDENCE LAW 414 (3d ed. 2011).
106. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 357–61 (2008).
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least made with awareness that the prosecution could use the statement.
Statements seeking help—requesting others call 911 for instance—would
not be testimonial.  Statements intentionally inculpating the accused and
made with full awareness that such statements would be helpful to the
prosecution later might be testimonial, though they would have to be dis-
tinguishable from mere casual statements to friends.
V. AUTHENTICATION
A. Authentication Generally
Authentication questions are by far the most interesting issues raised
by new social media.  Whereas the traditional hearsay rules seem to fit
nicely with new types of communication—which, after all, still remain out-
of-court statements—the rules of authentication fit less well.  There is little
push to alter the rules,107 but applying them to new media can be tricky.108
Essentially, the authentication question is a simple one: is the item
what its proponent claims it is?109  The authentication process requires two
steps.110  The first entails the gatekeeping role of the judge, who must de-
termine whether a jury could find the item authentic; the second involves
107. See, e.g., State v. Eleck 23 A.3d 818, 823 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011) (“[T]he emergence of social
media such as e-mail, text messaging and networking sites like Facebook may not require the creation
of new rules of authentication with respect to authorship.”); Commonwealth v. Purdy, 945 N.E.2d 372,
378, 381 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (“While e-mails and other forms of electronic communication present
their own opportunities for false claims of authorship, the basic principles of authentication are the
same.”) (citing United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 41 (D.D.C. 2006)); Lorraine v. Markel
Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 539 n.5 (D. Md. 2007) (noting the capacity of the current rules to handle
tricky questions of authenticity involving electronically stored information); In re F.P., 878 A.2d 91, 95
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (“We believe that e-mail messages and similar forms of electronic communication
can be properly authenticated within the existing framework of PA. R.E. 901 and Pennsylvania case
law.”).  Steven Goode, The Admissibility of Electronic Evidence, 29 REV. LITIG. 1, 2 (2009) (“the cur-
rent framework provided by the rules of evidence is adequate to the task”). But see Robbins, supra
note 8, at 36. (advocating a shift in focus from account ownership and content to authorship of the
evidence); Neil C. Magnuson & Bennett B. Borden, The Admissibility of Digital Evidence, 8 ABA
SCITECH L. 4 (2011) (noting the “need for a more robust and reliable approach to authentication”);
Moore, supra note 53, at 177–178, 181 (advocating for changes in the rules of authentication , hearsay,
and best evidence to accommodate the “unique issues presented by ESI [electronically stored material]
and that Rule 901(b) should also be amended to explicitly incorporate the use of technology as a
method of authentication”).
108. See Goode, supra note 107, at 6 (“While electronic evidence does not present any particularly
difficult analytical problems in terms of the law of evidence, it does pose some very real practical
problems.”) (footnotes omitted); Jaksic, supra note 45 (quoting John Palfrey, executive director of The
Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School: “There is a sense that this information
would be admissible if it’s verifiable, as with any other form of electronic discovery. The one issue is
going to be authentication as far as what is said online and who said it.”); Democko, supra note 1, at 371
(“[E]nacting new rules governing the authentication of electronic evidence, or specifically, evidence
from social networking sites, is not only unnecessary, but counterproductive.”).
109. FED. R. EVID. 901(a).  This question is one of conditional relevance under FED. R. EVID.
104(b).
110. See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 539 (discussing a “two-step process” for authentication).
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the jury’s revisiting of the authenticity question.111  As the notes to the Cal-
ifornia Evidence Code explain:
. . . the fact that the judge permits [a] writing to be admitted
in evidence does not necessarily establish the authenticity of
the writing; all that the judge has determined is that there
has been a sufficient showing of the authenticity of the writ-
ing to permit the trier of fact to find that it is authentic.112
For example, in a case involving a contract on which the defendant
claims his signature has been forged, the judge first considers the question
of authentication.  If no chance exists that it is the defendant’s signature,
then the document has no relevance, and the judge will keep it from the
jury.  Generally, however, if a legitimate question exists, the authenticity of
the signature will next go to the jury, especially if it is an ultimate issue in
the case.  In construing and applying Rule 901, federal courts hold that “a
document is properly authenticated if a reasonable juror could find in favor
of authenticity.”113
The authentication rules are by their structure not very rule-like.  In
the Federal Rules of Evidence, various illustrations, “examples only—not a
complete list,”114 follow the very general principle that the item must be
what its proponent claims.  Under the Rules, the relevant examples for
methods of authentication include testimony of a witness with knowl-
edge115 and distinctive characteristics.116  Unlike hearsay, which is very
technical and categorical,117 authentication is ultimately more flexible and
practical, but less uniform and predictable.
Evidence law is conservative by nature and slow to adapt to new forms
of technology.118  Professor Jennifer Mnookin has written about the fasci-
nating process by which courts slowly grew accustomed to the use of the
111. Id. at 539–40 (explaining that the court first determines whether the proponent has offered
evidence from which the jury could reasonably find the evidence authentic and that the jury next de-
cides authenticity as a matter of conditional relevance).
112. People v. Valdez, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 628, 633 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing CAL. EVID. CODE § 1400
(West 1995) (alteration in original)).
113. United States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 151 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Tin Yat
Chin, 371 F.3d 31, 38 (2d Cir. 2004)).
114. FED. R. EVID. 901(b).  This loose structure of the authentication rules raises the odd question
whether it is possible to “violate” an example.
115. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1) (“Testimony of a Witness with Knowledge: Testimony that an item is
what it is claimed to be.”)
116. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4) (“Distinctive characteristics and the Like:  The appearance, con-
tents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together with all
the circumstances.”). See People v. Fielding, No. C-062022, 2010 WL 2473344, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. June
18, 2010) (“Documents may be authenticated in various ways. ‘Circumstantial evidence, content and
location are all valid means of authentication.’ ” (quoting People v. Gibson, 90 Cal. App. 4th 371, 383
(2001)).
117. Eleanor Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1339 (1987).
118. Goode, supra note 107, at 4 (2009) (discussing admissibility of photographs, audio recordings,
and computer records, noting that “[o]ur jurisprudence is littered with examples of courts confronting
the admissibility of evidence based on new technologies, and courts have reacted in a predictable pat-
tern. At first, new technologies meet with judicial resistance.”).
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photograph as courtroom evidence.119  In 1899, one court refused to admit
photographs because “ ’either through want of skill on the part of the art-
ist, or inadequate instruments or materials, or through intentional and skill-
ful manipulation, a photograph may be not only inaccurate, but
dangerously misleading.’ ”120  The now quaint-seeming opposition to pho-
tographs as evidence that parties cannot authenticate is eerily reminiscent
of some of the current suspicions regarding the Internet and social media.
In both cases, judges express concerns that through the “intentional and
skillful manipulation”121 of the proponent, jurors may be deceived by fak-
ery and clever mock-ups.
B. Photographs
Ironically, social media raises few problems on the issue of photo-
graphs.  The process of authenticating a photo from Twitter, MySpace, or
Facebook is indistinguishable from authenticating a photo generally.  A
witness with knowledge must testify that the photograph is a fair and accu-
rate representation of what it purports to be.122  For instance, imagine
someone were to snap a shot of a parent dancing naked on a bar with an
alcoholic drink in hand and subsequently posted it on Facebook.  In a cus-
tody dispute, if the dancer’s ex-spouse wished to introduce the photo as
evidence of alcoholism and bad judgment, anyone at the scene could au-
thenticate the photo by testifying that it was a fair and accurate representa-
tion of the events of the evening in question.
Recently, commentators have raised questions about authenticating
digital photographs because of the ease of altering or “photoshopping”
them.123  Such techniques for detecting alteration in digital photography
119. Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of Truth: Photographic Evidence and the Power of Analogy,
10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 4 (1998) (“[P]hotography was recognized, almost from the time of its inven-
tion, as a potentially powerful juridical tool—perhaps even a dangerously powerful tool.  The meaning
and epistemological status of the photograph were intensely contested, both inside and outside the
courtroom.  Furthermore, the history of the legal use of photography is intimately intertwined with the
history of photographic technologies.”).
120. Goode, supra note 107, at 4 (quoting Cunningham v. Fair Haven & W. R. Co., 43 A. 1047,
1049 (Conn. 1899)).
121. Id.
122. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS § 4.09(1) (7th ed. 2008) (“Mod-
ernly, the prevailing view is that any person familiar with the scene or object depicted may verify the
photograph.”).
123. See Zachariah B. Parry, Note, Digital Manipulation and Photographic Evidence: Defrauding
the Courts One Thousand Words at a Time, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 175 (noting the relative
ease, low cost, and difficulty of detection where digital photographs are altered); Jill Witkowski, Note,
Can Juries Really Believe What They See?: New Foundational Requirements for the Authentication of
Digital Images, 10 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 267 (2002) (explaining the dangers of altering digital photog-
raphy and proposing changes to the authentication process). See also Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co.,
241 F.R.D. 534, 561 (D. Md. 2007) (explaining that digital photographs present unique authentication
problems because they are a form of electronically produced evidence that may be manipulated and
altered).
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are becoming increasingly sophisticated and inexpensive,124 and valid con-
cerns can be raised when digital images are enhanced.125  To the extent that
manipulation of digital photos is a problem, it is one not unique to social
media, but rather represents a problem with digital photography generally.
When faced with an authentication concern, one court noted: “Here, it was
Jessica herself who acknowledged that indeed, she had been drinking alco-
hol and the pictures accurately reflected that activity.  That testimony was
sufficient to authentic the photographs and they were properly admitted
into evidence.”126
Nevertheless, one recurrent use of photographs from social network-
ing has posed a conundrum for courts.  Often, parties wish to demonstrate
the gang affiliation of a witness or an opposing party.127  The State of Cali-
fornia, in a guide entitled A Parent’s Guide to Gangs, explains that “[g]ang
members often communicate, recruit, socialize and sell drugs using the In-
ternet and publish their own web page to show off their gang affiliation
(MySpace, Bebo, Facebook, etc.).”128  Some gang members begin their
taunting and fighting on social media, post the video of the fight online,
and then brag about it.129  This has obvious benefits for police investiga-
tions,130 but the question here is: how can these postings on Facebook,
Twitter, MySpace, etc., be used in court to demonstrate gang affiliation?
Setting aside the question of character evidence131 and unfair prejudice,132
124. See Chris Gaylord, Digital Detectives Discern Photoshop Fakery: New Software Combs for
Clues in al Qaeda Tapes, Harry Potter Pages, and Celebrity Waistlines, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug.
29, 2007), http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0829/p13s02-stct.html (discussing techniques for spotting
doctored photos); Mark L. Hoffman and Jesse Epstein, Image Manipulation and the Rules of Evidence:
The Admission of Digital Images and the Race to Detect Forgeries, 2 ANN. 2008 AAJ-CLE 1881 (2008)
(describing techniques for how to spot doctored photographs).
125. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 561–62.
126. Lalonde v. Lalonde, No. 2009–CA–002279–MR, 2011 WL 832465, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. Feb.
25, 2011) (“[A]lthough we acknowledge that modern digital photography techniques may allow for the
alteration of a photograph, Jessica did not suggest such techniques were employed.  She instead ac-
knowledged the photographs were accurate which leads to the conclusion they were not altered.”).
127. See, e.g., BROWNING, supra note 1, at 57 (discussing introduction of MySpace page to show
gang affiliation, thereby influencing bail determination).
128. CAL. ATTORNEY GEN. OFFICE, A Parent’s Guide to Gangs 12, available at http://www.cal-
grip.ca.gov/documents/Parents_Gangs_Hdbk.pdf.
129. See Scott Gutierrez, Street Gang Using Internet for Violent Bragging Rights; Masked Hood-
lums Making Threats at MySpace, Other Sites, SEATTLE PI (July 09, 2006, 10:00 PM, http://www.seat-
tlepi.com/local/article/Street-gangs-using-Internet-for-violent-bragging-1208477.php (citing a MySpace
page where a gang member points guns, flashes gang signs, and congratulates a fellow gang member for
beating someone up, writing: “I hope your hands feel a little better.  I will get the video to you of what
you did to that guy.  Keep it up babe boy.”)
130. See Thomas Watkins, Gangs Use of Twitter, Facebook on the Rise, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 2,
2010, 2:24PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/02/02/gangs-use-of-twitter-facebook_n_445551.
html (noting increased use of social media for gang communication and that concomitant police moni-
toring has led to arrests).
131. The Federal Rules prohibit the use of character evidence to prove propensity. FED. R. EVID.
404(a).  However, gang affiliation might be relevant to demonstrate motive or intent, which is a permis-
sible use of such evidence.  So it is permissible to use evidence of other acts to show motive or intent,
and gang affiliation might be relevant for such other purposes. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (permitting
evidence of other acts to show motive or intent).
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how is a photograph of a person flashing a gang symbol to be authenticated
on a networking site?
In United States v. Cole,133 the accused claimed no knowledge of a
drug conspiracy.  To show that he was a member of the Latin King gang
and knew the nature of the conspiracy, the government was allowed to
present evidence concerning Cole’s web page on MySpace.134  His web
page yielded evidence including photos depicting him wearing Latin King
colors, Cole’s listing of “drug wars” as a personal interest, and additional
photos depicting Latin King members and Latin King symbols.135  It is un-
clear whether the accused took the stand or whether any authentication
questions were even raised about the MySpace page.
In People v. Lenihan,136 the accused challenged his second-degree
murder conviction by arguing that he was unfairly prohibited from cross-
examining two state witnesses with photographs his mother had printed
from MySpace that allegedly depicted the witnesses and the victim making
hand gestures and wearing clothing suggesting affiliation with the Crips
gang.137  The New York appellate court approved the trial court’s refusal to
allow the defendant to admit the witness’s MySpace photos as a basis for
cross-examination.138  The court reasoned that because the defendant had
no idea who took the photos and under what circumstances they were
taken, “[i]n light of the ability to ‘photo shop’, or edit photographs on the
computer, the defendant could not authenticate the photographs.”139 Addi-
tionally, the Court was persuaded that the photos did not establish a good-
faith basis for cross-examining the witnesses because the connection to the
defendant was too remote and speculative, given that defendant denied be-
ing a member of a rival gang.140  Similarly, in People v. Beckley,141 the
court held that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence of the defen-
dant flashing a gang symbol on her MySpace page because “with the ad-
vent of computer software programs such as Adobe Photoshop it does not
always take skill, experience, or even cognizance to alter a digital
photo.”142  Apparently, the court required someone who was present at the
time the photo was taken to testify that it accurately depicted what it pur-
ported to show.143  The admission of the evidence, however, was deemed
harmless error.144
132. Even if admissible under Rule 404, Rule 403 presents another hurdle, excluding the evidence
of gang affiliation if the probative value of that evidence is significantly outweighed by its probative
value. See FED R. EVID. 403.
133. 423 F. App’x 452 (5th Cir. 2011).
134. Id. at 456.
135. Id. at 457.
136. 911 N.Y.S.2d 588 (App. Div. 2010).
137. Id. at 591.
138. Id. at 592.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 362 (Ct. App. 2010).
142. Id. at 367 (quoting Parry, supra note 123, at 183).
143. Id. (quoting People v. Bowley, 59 Cal. 2d 855, 859 (1963)).
144. Id.
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In both Cole and Lenihan, the courts’ emphasis on the technology and
the photographer seems misplaced.  The photos of individuals flashing gang
signs should have been admissible if a person with knowledge had been at
the event.  Arguably, anyone who had seen the individual do so could tes-
tify that these photos were a fair and accurate representation of what the
person looked like using gang signs.  In the Lenihan case, which involved
cross-examination of a prosecution witness, the witness himself could have
served as a person with knowledge, and the accused should at least have
been able to pose initial questions to see if the MySpace page could be
authenticated.
C. Authenticating Posts, Updates, and Tweets
Even more difficult than the issues surrounding authenticating photo-
graphs are the authentication questions concerning written posts, messages,
and tweets on social networks.  The initial response from courts has been
mixed.  Back in 1999, in St. Clair v. Johnny’s Oyster & Shrimp, Inc.,145 a
court opined: “There is no way Plaintiff can overcome the presumption
that the information he discovered on the Internet is inherently untrust-
worthy.  Anyone can put anything on the Internet . . . Hackers can adulter-
ate the content on any website.”146  Thirteen years later, one can still find
courts that are extremely wary of the new-fangled ways that young people
communicate.147  One can also find contrary examples, however, where the
courts, though aware of potential problems with authentication, neverthe-
less allow the admission of remarks transmitted via social media.
Courts generally address four types of authentication concerns: (1)
general lack of proper foundation; (2) the possibility that the entire social
networking page is a fake;148 (3) the possibility that a genuine existing page
has been hacked; and (4) the possibility that someone has appropriated the
site of another by obtaining the password through friendship, phishing,149
or a computer left logged on and unattended in a place where third parties
could post in the owner’s name.150
Tweets, MySpace pages, and Facebook posts are not self-authenticat-
ing, as are, for instance, some certified public documents.151  Certainly,
145. 76 F. Supp. 2d 773 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
146. Id. at 774–75.
147. See Uncel, supra note 2, at 44 (“Some courts, however, are making it difficult to admit social
networking evidence because of their doubts that such evidence is authentic.”).
148. Cf. Moore, supra note 53, at 148 (discussing the “unique authentication concerns” created by
“the potential for the easier alteration or fabrication of ESI [electronically stored evidence] than tradi-
tional forms of physical evidence”).
149. “Phishing is a way of attempting to acquire information such as usernames, passwords, and
credit card details by masquerading as a trustworthy entity in an electronic communication.” Phishing,
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing (last visited June 24, 2012).
150. Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 641–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (noting that “the provenance
of such electronic writings can sometimes be open to question—computers can be hacked, protected
passwords can be compromised, and cell phones can be purloined . . . .”).
151. See generally FED. R. EVID. 902; State v. Eleck, 23 A.3d 818, 821 n.4 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011)
(noting that the proponent of the evidence did not and could not argue that the Facebook messages
were self-authenticating). Cf. Commonwealth v. Purdy, 945 N.E.2d 372 (Mass. 2011) (holding that
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judges cannot just accept a piece of paper, printed out from a computer,
and treat it as authentic without more (though I suspect this happens fre-
quently in some courts, particularly with pro se litigants in domestic dis-
putes).  Authentication is easy where the party admits that the page is hers
and she made the post, as this fairly comports with the example of authenti-
cation by a person with knowledge.  But what if the alleged poster is not a
party, or is a party who does not take the witness stand (such as where she
exercises her right against self-incrimination) or simply denies the post as
her own?  Courts struggling with these questions have reached very differ-
ent results.
1. The Stricter Approach
In Griffin v. State,152 the Maryland Supreme Court, in a long opinion,
reversed and remanded a conviction, holding that pages from MySpace ad-
mitted against the accused were not properly authenticated.  The State
sought to introduce the MySpace profile of the accused’s girlfriend to
demonstrate that she threatened another witness, who had significantly
changed his testimony upon retrial.153  The accused’s girlfriend was not
questioned about the pages.154  Instead, the State attempted to authenti-
cate the pages as belonging to her through the testimony of the lead inves-
tigator in the case.155  The trial judge allowed the investigator to testify in
support of authentication because the page (1) contained the photograph
of a person who looked like the girlfriend, (2) used the nickname “Boozy”
for her boyfriend, a known nickname of the accused, (3) included the girl-
friend’s date of birth, and (4) contained the post: “FREE BOOZY!!!!
JUST REMEMBER SNITCHES GET STITCHES!! U KNOW WHO
YOU ARE!!”156  In authenticating the threat, the trial court reasoned that
the posting contained identifying factors and information that only a few
people would know and was posted from her regular social media
address.157
The Maryland Supreme Court reversed, explaining that “[t]he identity
of who generated the profile may be confounding, because ‘a person ob-
serving the online profile of a user with whom the observer is unacquainted
has no idea whether the profile is legitimate.’”158  The court fretted that
evidence that electronic communication originates from e-mail or social networking website that bears
purported author’s name is not sufficient alone to authenticate it).
152. 19 A.3d 415, 418 (Md. 2011), rev’g 995 A.2d 791 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010).  The Maryland
Supreme Court applied MD. EVID. R. 5–901, which is identical to the Federal Rule. See supra notes
96–102 and accompanying text.
153. Griffin, 19 A.3d at 418.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Griffin v. State, 995 A.2d 791 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010).
158. Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415,421 (Md. 2011) (citing Nathan Petrashek, Comment, The Fourth
Amendment and the Brave New World of Online Social Networking, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 1495, 1499 n.16
(2010)).  This sounds suspiciously like the famous NEW YORKER cartoon, depicting a dog at the com-
puter with the caption, “On the internet, nobody knows you’re a dog.” See On the Internet, nobody
knows you’re a dog, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_the_Internet,_nobody_knows_you’re_
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“anyone can create a fictitious account and masquerade under another per-
son’s name or can gain access to another’s account by obtaining the user’s
username and password.”159  The Court therefore found that the “potential
for fabricating or tampering with electronically stored information on a so-
cial networking site thus poses significant challenges from the standpoint of
authentication of printouts of the site.”160
The Maryland Supreme Court also stated that an inadequate founda-
tion was laid for authenticating the MySpace page because the State failed
to offer any extrinsic evidence describing MySpace, explain how the inves-
tigator obtained the MySpace pages at issue, or adequately authenticate
the MySpace profile and the posting as belonging to the accused’s girl-
friend.  The Court took seriously the prospect that “someone other than
the alleged author may have accessed the account and posted the message
in question” and “that another user could have created the profile in issue
or authored the ‘snitches get stitches’ posting.”161  The girlfriend’s picture,
coupled with her birth date and location, were not deemed sufficiently “dis-
tinctive characteristics” to authenticate the printout from the MySpace ac-
count, given the possibility that the girlfriend might not have made the
page in the first place.162
The Griffin majority suggested what would constitute adequate forms
of authentication, noting that the “first, and perhaps most obvious method
would be to ask the purported creator if she indeed created the profile and
also if she added the posting in question.”163  Second, the court suggested
searching the computer of the person who allegedly owns the page or made
the posting “to determine whether that computer was used to originate the
social networking profile and posting in question.”164  Third, the court sug-
gested “obtain[ing] information directly from the social networking website
that links the establishment of the profile to the person who allegedly cre-
ated it and also links the posting sought to be introduced to the person who
initiated it.”165
Two judges dissented in Griffin, arguing that the MySpace page was
adequately authenticated.  The dissenters believed that a reasonable juror
could conclude, based on the picture, birthday, and references to freeing
a_dog (last visited June 24, 2012).  Since the year 2000, this is the magazine’s most reproduced cartoon.
Id.
159. Id. at 421.
160. Id. at 422.
161. Id. at 423 (citing Griffin v. State, 995 A.2d 791, 805 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010)).
162. Id. at 424 (“[A] printout of an image from such a site requires a greater degree of authentica-
tion than merely identifying the date of birth of the creator and her visage in a photograph on the site in
order to reflect that [the girlfriend] was its creator and the author of the ‘snitches get stitches’
language.”).
163. Id. at 427.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 428 (citing People v. Clevenstine, 891 N.Y.S.2d 511, 514 (App. Div. 2009) (describing a
case where an investigator from the computer crime unit of the State Police testified that “he had
retrieved such conversations from the hard drive of the computer used by the victims”)).  The Court
seems unaware that MySpace and Facebook will only certify ownership of a page and will not validate
individual postings.  Searching a hard drive is something different altogether.
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“Boozy,” that the redacted printed pages of the MySpace profile demon-
strated sufficiently distinct characteristics to demonstrate that they were
what the prosecution claimed them to be.166  The dissent explained its view
that “[t]he technological heebie jeebies discussed in the Majority Opinion
go . . . not to the admissibility of the print-outs . . . but rather to the weight
to be given the evidence by the trier of fact.”167  The dissent also noted that
“[t]he potentialities that are of concern to the Majority Opinion are fit sub-
jects for cross-examination or rebuttal testimony.”168
Commonwealth v. Williams169 provides another example of a strict ap-
proach to authentication of social media.  In Williams, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts would not admit instant messages a witness had
received through her account on MySpace.170  The witness testified that the
defendant’s brother had contacted her “four times on her MySpace ac-
count . . . urging her not to testify . . . or to claim a lack of memory regard-
ing the events of the night of the murder.”171  At trial, the witness testified
that the accused’s brother had a picture of himself on his MySpace page,
she recognized his MySpace screen (from which she had previously re-
ceived messages), and the document printed from her MySpace account
indicated that the messages were in fact sent by a user with the brother’s
same screen name and picture.172  The Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts held that the State had laid an inadequate foundation to authenti-
cate the MySpace messages because it failed to offer any evidence
regarding who had access to the MySpace page and whether another au-
thor could have posted the messages:
Although it appears that the sender of the messages was us-
ing [the brother]’s MySpace Web “page,” there is no testi-
mony (from [the witness] or another) regarding how secure
such a Web page is, who can access a MySpace Web page,
whether codes are needed for such access, etc. . . .  Here,
while the foundational testimony established that the
messages were sent by someone with access to Williams’s
MySpace Web page, it did not identify the person who actu-
ally sent the communication.  Nor was there expert testi-
mony that no one other than Williams could communicate
from that Web page.173
166. Id. at 429–30 (Harrell, J., dissenting) (“As long as a reasonable juror could conclude that the
proffered evidence is what its proponent purports it to be, the evidence should be admitted.”).
167. Id. (footnotes defining “heebie jeebies” omitted).
168. Id.
169. 926 N.E.2d 1162 (Mass. 2010).
170. Id. at 1171.
171. Id. at 1172.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1172–73 (citations omitted).  Similarly, in United States v. Jackson, the accused was
charged with mail and wire fraud and obstruction of justice after making false claims of racial harass-
ment against the United Parcel Service.  208 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 2000).  At trial, the accused tried to
admit postings from “the Euro-American Student Union and Storm Front,” in which the white suprem-
acist groups gloated about Jackson’s case and took credit for the UPS mailings. Jackson, 208 F.3d at
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A final example of some courts’ hesitancy in authenticating written
posts from social media comes from Connecticut.  In State v. Eleck,174 the
trial court excluded evidence that the accused wished to introduce from his
Facebook account documenting messages sent to him from a key witness
for the State.175  The witness acknowledged that the message was sent from
her Facebook account but denied that she had done it.  She testified that
someone had hacked into her account and changed her Facebook pass-
word.176  The court expressed skepticism about her account being hacked,
noting that “this suggestion is dubious under the particular facts at hand,
given that the messages were sent before the alleged hacking of the account
took place.”177  Furthermore, immediately after being questioned about
her post in court, the witness removed the accused from her list of
Facebook friends.178  Despite doubting the hacking event mentioned by the
witness, the court nevertheless found the refusal to authenticate the wit-
ness’s post within the trial court’s discretion.  The court in Eleck explained:
The need for authentication arises in this context because an
electronic communication, such as a Facebook message, an
e-mail or a cell phone text message, could be generated by
someone other than the named sender. This is true even
with respect to accounts requiring a unique user name and
password, given that account holders frequently remain
logged in to their accounts while leaving their computers
and cell phones unattended.  Additionally, passwords and
website security are subject to compromise by hackers.
Consequently, proving only that a message came from a
particular account, without further authenticating evidence,
has been held to be inadequate proof of authorship.179
Given these authenticity concerns, “it was incumbent on the defen-
dant, as the proponent, to advance other foundational proof to authenti-
cate that the proffered messages did, in fact, come from [the witness] and
not simply from her Facebook account.”180  The court found that mere
proof of ownership was insufficient unless supplemented by authentication
via identifying characteristics, which would have had to have been much
637.  The court affirmed the trial court’s refusal to admit the web page because it lacked an appropriate
foundation; the accused did not demonstrate that the web postings “actually were posted by the groups,
as opposed to being slipped onto the groups’ websites by Jackson herself, who was a skilled computer
user.” Id. at 638.
174. 23 A.3d 818 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011).
175. Id. at 820.  The witness testified that the accused stated before the fight that “if anyone
messes with me tonight, I am going to stab them.” Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 824.
178. Id. at 821.
179. Id.at 822.
180. Id. at 824.
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more distinctive than the general conversation regarding past friction be-
tween the two.181
2. A More Liberal Approach
In State v. Yates,182 the State introduced postings from a MySpace ac-
count named “Murdaman Flocka” that the State demonstrated was created
and used by Yates.  A representative from MySpace.com testified as to the
creation of the account, giving the date it was established with the email of
the accused.183  The State also presented testimony from a witness whose
photograph was included on the MySpace page, supporting the contention
that it was Yates’s MySpace account.  The profile information, the picture
of Yates as the account holder, and the use of the accused’s email were also
indicative of its being Yates’s account.  According to the appellate court,
the MySpace postings “connected Yates to the shootings and disclosed his
feelings of betrayal and being ‘pissed off’ by people talking to the po-
lice.”184  The court rejected the accused’s argument that the State failed to
properly authenticate the MySpace posting and establish that the postings
belonged to him.  The court noted that the authentication standard of evi-
dence sufficient to support a finding “is not rigorous, and the threshold of
admissibility articulated in it is low.”185  The court concluded that “Yates’s
contention that anyone could have created the postings goes to the weight
of the evidence that the jury should consider.”186
In People v. Valdez,187 the California Appellate Court affirmed the
authentication of the accused’s MySpace page without verification from the
provider.188  The page displayed a picture of the accused’s face and in-
cluded greetings from friends and family members by name.  The page con-
tained a list of interests, which included gangs.189  The court explained, with
an ironic, dismissive tone, that “[t]his suggested the page belonged to
Valdez, rather than someone else by the same name, who happened to look
just like him.”190  The court acknowledged that the accused was free to
argue otherwise to the jury but concluded that “a reasonable trier of fact
could conclude from the posting of personal photographs, communications,
and other details that the MySpace page belonged to him.”191
In Tienda v. State,192 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the
trial court’s authentication of the MySpace pages of an alleged murderer,
181. The court provided this example: when the accused sent the message asking, “why would you
wanna talk to me,” the other party (allegedly the witness) replied, “The past is the past.”  Id. at 820 n.2.
182. No. 96774, 2012 WL 759201 (Ohio Ct. App. March 8, 2012).
183. Id. at *6.
184. Id. at *1.
185. Id. at *6 (citations omitted).
186. Id. (citations omitted).
187. 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 628 (Ct. App. 2011).
188. Id. at 633.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. 358 S.W.3d 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
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Ronnie Tienda.  The pages were originally brought to the prosecution’s at-
tention by the victim’s sister.193  The State admitted the pages through the
testimony of the victim’s sister.194  The prosecutor also offered affidavits
and subscriber reports associated with each profile account that it subpoe-
naed from MySpace.195  The subscriber reports indicated that the MySpace
accounts were created by a “Ron Mr. T” or “Smiley Face” (the appellant’s
nickname).196  The account holder wrote that he lived in “D TOWN” or
“dallas” (as did the accused) and registered the accounts with a “ronnie-
tiendajr@” or “smileys_shit @” email address.197  The page included a men-
tion of the deceased with the comment “RIP David Valadez” linked to a
song that was played at the victim’s funeral.198
Instant message comments exchanged between the MySpace page
holder and other MySpace users included specific references to the shoot-
ing and subsequent investigation.199  The messages made specific reference
to snitches, and the MySpace page owner complained about his electronic
monitor, which was a condition of his house arrest pre-trial.200  Tienda de-
nied that the pages were his.  In cross-examining the deceased’s sister, “de-
fense counsel elicited testimony regarding the ease with which a person
could create a MySpace page in someone else’s name and then send
messages, purportedly written by the person reflected in the profile picture,
without their approval.”201  The defense emphasized the prosecution’s fail-
ure to prove through any technological or expert evidence that the appel-
lant created the account.202
In affirming the admissibility of the MySpace pages, Tienda began by
reviewing the generally low standard for authentication:
In performing its Rule 104 gate-keeping function, the trial
court itself need not be persuaded that the proffered evi-
dence is authentic.  The preliminary question for the trial
court to decide is simply whether the proponent of the evi-
dence has supplied facts that are sufficient to support a rea-
sonable jury determination that the evidence he has
proffered is authentic.203
The court held that “the internal content of the MySpace postings—
photographs, comments, and music—was sufficient circumstantial evidence
193. Id. at 635.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 636.
201. Id.
202. Id.  There was no attempt, for instance, to trace the IP address listed in the subscriber report
to the appellant’s personal computer. Id.
203. Id. at 638.
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to establish a prima facie case such that a reasonable juror could have
found that they were created and maintained by the appellant.”204  In what
can only be read as a sarcastic critique of the accused’s objections and the
timidity of courts205 that have been more grudging in their willingness to
authenticate such pages, the court observed:
It is, of course, within the realm of possibility that the appel-
lant was the victim of some elaborate and ongoing conspir-
acy.  Conceivably some unknown malefactors somehow
stole the appellant’s numerous self-portrait photographs,
concocted boastful messages about [the victim’s] murder
and the circumstances of that shooting, was aware of the
music played at [the victim’s] funeral, knew when the appel-
lant was released on pretrial bond with electronic monitor-
ing and referred to that year-long event along with stealing
the photograph of the grinning appellant lounging in his
chair while wearing his ankle monitor.  But that is an alter-
nate scenario whose likelihood and weight the jury was enti-
tled to assess once the State had produced a prima facie
showing that it was the appellant, not some unidentified
conspirators or fraud artists, who created and maintained
these MySpace pages.206
Finally, in People v. Fielding,207 a twenty-one year-old woman who was
being prosecuted for having sex with a fourteen-year-old boy objected to
the admission of their message exchanges on MySpace.  The victim’s father
testified that he had printed all the communications between his son and
the defendant from his son’s MySpace account and did not alter them.208
The accused argued that the messages were not sent by her and questioned
the accuracy of the printouts that the boy’s father had printed from the
boy’s computer, arguing it was possible to edit the conversations.  This
claim was bolstered by the fact that some conversations were not fully re-
produced, and that the victim’s MySpace page had once been hacked.209
The court noted “the fact that a document was or may have been altered
does not preclude a preliminary finding of authenticity, where the claimed
alterations are immaterial.”210  The court also credited the testimony of the
204. Id. at 642.
205. The court in Tienda addressed and specifically disagreed with the State of Maryland’s ap-
proach in Griffin. See supra notes 188–201 and accompanying text.
206. Id. at 645–46.
207. No. C-062022, 2010 WL 2473344 (Cal. Ct. App. June 18, 2010).
208. Id. at *2.
209. Id. at *3 (accused argued that “the packet of exchanges prepared by the victim’s father was
incomplete and inaccurate. For example, in the exchange which shows that she said she wanted to have
sex, the victim erased her message, wrote a new message, and then replied to it.  Other exchanges were
not reproduced fully.”).  On cross-examination, the victim conceded that someone had “once ‘hacked’
into his MySpace account and changed the ‘mood status’ he had posted from ‘I’m ready to win’ to ‘I’m
ready to be gay.’ ” Id. at *4.
210. Id. at *5 (citations omitted).
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victim, who recognized the conversations on MySpace; the victim claimed
he knew it was the accused because he was often “talking on the phone to
her at the same time.”211  Ultimately, the court concluded that “the possi-
bility that the incriminating messages purportedly coming from defendant
were in fact sent or posted by someone else went to the weight of the evi-
dence, not its admissibility.”212  In answer to a concern about ownership of
the page, the trial court noted the defense could subpoena records from
MySpace.213
3. Potential Analogues to Authenticating Social Media—Authenticating
Other Types of Evidence
In Lorraine, a long opinion full of dicta setting out the requirements of
various forms of authentication, Judge Grimm rightly observed that “any
serious consideration of the requirement to authenticate electronic evi-
dence needs to acknowledge that, given the wide diversity of such evi-
dence, there is no single approach to authentication that will work in all
instances.”214  Although each form of electronic communication presents
its own authentication conundrums, it is useful to try to draw analogies
among various forms of evidence, particularly electronic evidence.215
Courts have considerably more experience with authenticating phone
call and emails (and, to a lesser extent, instant messages) than they do with
social media.216  Each type of communication presents possible templates
for the authentication of Facebook pages and other social networking cites.
Like social media, phone calls and emails involve a level of anonymity
and the potential for impersonation.217  The example for authenticating a
telephone call in the Federal Rules of Evidence requires an assigned num-
ber and either self-identification of the person or a call to a business for
business-related transactions.218  In Williams,219 the court analogized a
message on MySpace to a telephone call, and noted that:
211. Id. at *4. (At a pretrial hearing, the victim “testified he had had a MySpace account since he
was 12 years old, and defendant was a ‘friend’ on his page between September and December 2007”
and “identified pages of copied messages dated between September and December 2007, exchanged
between himself and defendant, via their MySpace accounts.”).
212. Id. at *5.
213. Id. at *3.
214. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 553–54 (D. Md. 2007).
215. The history of photograph authentication reveals courts’ tendencies to engage in analogic
reasoning, searching for what social media is most similar to among the types of evidence that we
already know how to authenticate. See Mnookin, supra note 119.  Professor Mnookin makes a persua-
sive case that the analogies have transformative effects in both directions, changing understanding not
only of the novel entity, but also the types of evidence it was compared to that formed the basis for the
analogy. Id. at 74.  In this moment of great flux, where courts are divided on the questions of authenti-
cating social media, it will be interesting to see how phone calls and emails are used as analogies and
how, in turn, authentication of social media may alter how these relatively accepted forms of evidence
are authenticated.
216. See Democko, supra note 1 (drawing the analogy to email and instant messaging).
217. See Uncel, supra note 2, at 60–61 (drawing analogies regarding authenticating social media to
authenticating phone conversations and emails).
218. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(6).
219. 926 N.E.2d 1162 (Mass. 2010).
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a witness’s testimony that he or she has received an incom-
ing call from a person claiming to be ‘A,’ without more, is
insufficient evidence to admit the call as a conversation with
‘A.’  Here, while the foundational testimony established
that the messages were sent by someone with access to Wil-
liams’s MySpace Web page, it did not identify the person
who actually sent the communication.220
The Williams analysis is faulty.  If we know someone is calling from his
own phone (something easily accomplished with caller ID) and self-identi-
fies when he calls (e.g., “Hi, this is Bob.”), that would be sufficient under
Rule 901(b)(6) to authenticate the phone call.  A posting on Bob’s
Facebook page actually provides more points of identification such as
photos, birth date, geographic information, and time stamp.
Another potential analogy is to email, a form of electrically stored in-
formation with which judges are probably more familiar.  Emails tend to be
authenticated by their distinctive characteristics, such as content displaying
familiarity with people and events that its purported authors know.  Also,
the timeline of email exchanges may correlate with other established
events.221  Metadata222 embedded in the email also can trace its prove-
nance.  Finally, when the email involves a reply, it is reasonable to assume
that the replying writer is authentically the sender, since the original writer
will recognize the original email content and be able to explain where he
220. Id. at 1172–73.
221. See Massimo v. State, 144 S.W.3d 210 (Tex. App. 2004) (authenticating email because, among
other reasons, it was sent to the email address of the victim claiming harassment shortly after a physical
fight, and it referenced the physical fight); Fenje v. Feld, 301 F. Supp. 2d 781, 809 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (“E-
mail communications may be authenticated as being from the purported author based on an affidavit of
the recipient; the e-mail address from which it originated; comparison of the content to other evidence;
and/or statements or other communications from the purported author acknowledging the e-mail com-
munication that is being authenticated.”).
222. Metadata is defined as “data providing information about one or more aspects of the data,
such as:
• Means of creation of the data;
• Purpose of the data;
• Time and date of creation;
• Creator or author of data;
• Location on a computer network where the data was created; and
• Standards used.
For example, a digital image may include metadata that describes how large the picture is, the color
depth, the image resolution, when the image was created, and other data. A text document’s metadata
may contain information about how long the document is, who the author is, when the document was
written, and a short summary of the document.” Metadata, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Metadata (last visited June 24, 2012).
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sent it.223  The mere “from” on an email without more is probably insuffi-
cient to authenticate the email,224 but additional information from “con-
firming circumstances,”225 such as use of the proper password, attachments
that help identify the sender, special language, non-public information, and
metadata about the trail of the email can assist in authentication.226  Ac-
cording to one Massachusetts court, claims of hacking email go to the
weight and not the admissibility of email messages.”227  Social media, while
sharing some attributes with phone calls and emails, have their own distinc-
tive characteristics.228  In some ways, social media seems more amenable to
easy identification because they often contain date stamps and photos.
4. Which Approach is Better?
Judge Grimm, author of Lorraine’s long exegesis regarding admissibil-
ity of electronically stored information, argues that “the inability to get evi-
dence admitted because of a failure to authenticate it almost always is a
self-inflicted injury which can be avoided by thoughtful advance prepara-
tion.”229  Given some courts’ strict approach to authenticating social media,
I beg to differ.  Although it is true much of the time that failure to prepare
adequately can leave an attorney flat-footed when trying to authenticate a
piece of evidence, in this time of transition when courts are only slowly
accommodating to the new social media and new means of communication,
some courts are unnecessarily grudging in authenticating information ema-
nating from social networking sites.230
223. See Lorraine v. Markel American Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 554–555 (D. Md. 2007). See
Massimo, 144 S.W.3d at 216 (authentication of email because, among other reasons, victim had corre-
sponded with accused at the same email address in the past). Cf. United States v. Macaluso, 460 F.
App’x 862, 865 (11th Cir. 2012) (authenticating instant messenger chats between the accused and his
victims “because the victims were able to testify to the contents.”).
224. See Commonwealth v. Purdy, 945 N.E.2d 372, 378, 381 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (“Evidence that
the defendant’s name is written as the author of an e-mail or that the electronic communication
originates from an e-mail or a social networking Web site such as Facebook or MySpace that bears the
defendant’s name is not sufficient alone to authenticate the electronic communication as having been
authored or sent by the defendant.”) (citations omitted). Goode, supra note 107, at 12 (“E-mail ac-
counts can be used without the owner’s permission. Therefore, the mere fact that an e-mail bears a
particular e-mail address will often prove inadequate to authenticate the identity of the author; typically
courts demand at least a little more evidence.”).
225. Purdy, 945 N.E.2d at 381.
226. Goode, supra note 107, at 29 n.115 (citing IMWINKELRIED, supra note 122,  at §4.03[4][b]).
Professor Imwinkelried also provides detailed instruction on how to authenticate email messages using
cryptography that require evidence that the user owns the key to unlock the cryptography and provides
a sample foundation for proving the chain of custody for the handling of email by an email service). Id.
227. Purdy, 945 N.E.2d at 381–82.  In Purdy, the email messages were actually found on the hard
drive of the computer. Id.
228. Cf. Payne, supra note 8, at 842 (distinguishing information on social media from other elec-
tronically stored information for discovery purposes because evidence from social media is (1) more
difficult to access, (2) personal, (3) inherently intimate and carries with it privacy implications, and (4)
allows users to choose who can view their information).
229. 241 F.R.D. 534, 542 (D. Md. 2007).
230. Merritt, supra note 36, at 51–52 (“[J]udges approach social media evidence with trepidation.
The anonymity of the internet, combined with the ephemeral nature of some communications, makes
some judges wary of accepting social media statements at face value.”).
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Two procedural matters necessarily focus the debate.  The first con-
cerns the evidentiary standard for authentication. As the court in Lorraine
observed: “A party seeking to admit an exhibit need only make a prima
facie showing that it is what he or she claims it to be.  This is not a particu-
larly high barrier to overcome.”231  Unsurprisingly, the courts that are lib-
eral in allowing authentication of social media emphasize this standard,
which sets a very low bar for admission.232
Second, in understanding appellate court decisions, it is important to
acknowledge that the standard of review is abuse of discretion.  As the
Tienda court explained: “If the trial court’s ruling that a jury could reasona-
bly find proffered evidence authentic is at least ‘within the zone of reasona-
ble disagreement,’ a reviewing court should not interfere.”233  Technically,
a reviewing court should only decide whether the trial court abused its dis-
cretion in making the authentication ruling.  However, many courts seem
to be taking the opportunity to explain their views of authentication, while
leaving the status quo in place by resorting to the harmless error doctrine
when they disagree with the trial court’s ruling.
To analyze how courts may be making the authentication task more
challenging than it should be, it is worth separating concerns about page
ownership from concerns about hijacking of the page.
a. Page Ownership
Certainly, it makes sense that the proponent of the social network evi-
dence somehow proves ownership of the page or profile in question.  That
can be done easily if the page owner is a witness.  If the owner of the page
is present, it is worth authenticating the page, at least so far as that the page
exists and the witness created it.234
How should a party authenticate the ownership of the site when such
ownership is denied by its purported creator or when the purported creator
is not a witness who can be questioned?  When the page owner does not
testify from personal knowledge, other means of authentication include: (1)
verification by the provider regarding who set up the page, (2) testimony of
231. Lorraine v. Markel American Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 542 (D. Md. 2007); Dickens v. State,
927 A.2d 32, 37 (2007) (quoting United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 38 (D.D.C. 2006))
(“[T]he burden of proof for authentication is slight, and the court ‘need not find that the evidence is
necessarily what the proponent claims, but only that there is sufficient evidence that the jury ultimately
might do so.’ ”) (emphasis in original).
232. See, e.g., Ohio v. Bell, 882 N.E.2d 502, 512 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2008) (observing that that
threshold for admissibility “is quite low—even lower than the preponderance of the evidence,” and that
“[o]ther jurisdictions characterize documentary evidence as properly authenticated if ‘a reasonable ju-
ror could find in favor of authenticity.’ ”).
233. Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (quoting Montgomery v. State,
810 S.W.3d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)). See In re F.P., 878 A.2d 91, 93 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005)
(“Admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only upon
a showing that the trial court clearly abused its discretion.”).
234. Perhaps one reason for the strict standard of authentication in Williams was that the prosecu-
tion did not ask the witness herself about the MySpace page in question. See supra notes 169–73 and
accompanying text.
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an expert who found traces of the page on the purported owner’s com-
puter,235 (3) statement of another witness with knowledge of the page or
account’s ownership, and (4) circumstantial evidence that the page belongs
to its purported owner.
Parties can obtain provider verification with a warrant or a valid sub-
poena.  The providers do not, however, verify the content of the site—they
just verify who created the page.236
Verification from the provider and expert analysis of the owner’s com-
puter to establish ownership can be expensive and time-consuming.  Be-
cause no other person may have first-hand knowledge of the page or
account ownership, courts must decide whether social network pages can
be authenticated via the circumstantial evidence of distinctive characteris-
tics, as anticipated by Rule 901(b)(4).  In United States v. Grant,237 the
court relied on Mil. R. Evid. 901(b)(4) to authenticate evidence via
“[a]ppearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive
characteristics, taken in conjunction with the circumstances . . . .”238  Each
Facebook message contained the name of the accused and included a pic-
ture of him in uniform.239  The witness testified that she had chatted about
events known to her and the accused on the Facebook page in question and
texted the accused using a number transmitted to her on that same
Facebook account.240
Another form of circumstantial evidence is the behavior of the pur-
ported page-owner.  Courts can consider the fact that the page or posting
was taken down immediately after a party inquired about it in the litigation
process.241
b. Concerns About Creating a Fake Page
Least convincing is the concern that the page was just a made-up farce
or an attempt to frame an innocent person.  Certainly, there are examples
of people making fake pages on behalf of others.  To create a free page on
a social network does not require much—just a full name, email address,
password, gender, and date of birth.242  Even when the person does exist,
235. Commonwealth v. Purdy, 945 N.E.2d 372, 378 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (police “made an exact
copy of the hard drive of the defendant’s computer and, in searching it, located numerous e-mails, of
which ten e-mail exchanges were admitted in evidence.”).
236. The content can sometimes be validated by various “wayback” services that assemble and
save postings on the web. See Wayback Machine, INTERNET ARCHIVE,  http://archive.org/web/web.php
(last visited June 24, 2012); Specht v. Google Inc., 758 F. Supp. 2d 570 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (describing the
Internet Archive as providing users screen shots of websites that allegedly depict how the website ap-
peared at a particular time.).
237. ACM S31768, 2011 WL 6015856 (Air Force Ct. Crim. App. 2011).
238. Id. at *1 (quoting MIL. R. EVID. 901(b)(4)).
239. Id. at *2.
240. Id.
241. In State v. Eleck, 23 A.3d 818 (Conn App. Ct. 2011), the witness who denied the authenticity
of the posting immediately unfriended the accused after she was questioned about their
communication.
242. Uncel, supra note 2, at 47.
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however, fake pages are usually easy to spot for what they are.243  For in-
stance, it is not hard to find pranks where students make fake, unflattering
social networking pages about their school principals,244 or someone cre-
ates a MySpace page purportedly in the name of a church pastor describing
homosexual conduct and drug use.245  Such pages are self-evident parodies
easy to unmask as non-genuine.  Where a genuine question arises about
who owns the page, the service providers can be subpoenaed to provide
that information.  As I argue below, that should not be standard procedure
in every case.
c. Concerns About Hacking or Opportunistic Signing on to
Someone Else’s Page
It is also possible for someone to hack into or temporarily appropriate
an existing page.246  This can be accomplished by installing malicious
software to record keystrokes, stealing or cracking someone’s password, or
gaining the trust of someone who is duped into voluntarily sharing access
information.247  The court in State v. Eleck deemed the potential for hack-
ing a crucial factor that “highlights the general lack of security of the me-
dium . . . .”248  In Commonwealth v. Purdy,249 the accused in a prostitution
case objected to the authenticity of emails, claiming that his computer was
located “near the massage room” and that “it was always on and that other
people in the salon, particularly the masseuses, knew the passwords to his
computer and used the computer frequently.  He testified that they used
his e-mail account to play pranks on him and that they answered e-mails in
his name.”250
Some commentators believe that this risk is so substantial that authen-
tication of the owner’s account is insufficient and that courts must insist on
heightened authentication proving actual authorship.251  I disagree and find
myself supporting the logic of the court in Tienda252—that such elaborate
hoaxes are unlikely and should not drive the authentication process.
243. United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
244. Layshock v. Hermitage School Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 207–10 (2011) (chronicling a fake MyS-
pace profile of a principal, including parodic reference to his girth, drunkenness, and drug use); Draker
v. Schreiber, 271 S.W.3d 318 (Tex. 2008) (describing a case where a MySpace page created by students
purported to be the page of their vice principal; the page contained explicit sexual references, in addi-
tion to the vice principal’s name, photo, and place of employment).
245. Clear v. Superior Court, No. E050414, 2010 WL 2029016 (Cal. Ct. App. May 24, 2010).
246. Uncel, supra note 2, at 68 (“[A]lthough the metadata and IP address can identify the com-
puter that created the data, it cannot necessarily identify the actual person who created the data.”).
247. See Robbins, supra note 8, at 10–13.
248. 23 A.3d 818, 824 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011).
249. 945 N.E.2d 372, 378 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011).
250. Id.
251. See Robbins, supra note 8, at 34–35 (arguing that authorship factors should be conditions of
admissibility and should not go to weight); Magnuson & Borden, supra note 108 (“Authentication
under Rule 901(b)(4) is potentially as problematic, as the indicia of reliability considered under this
subsection, if susceptible to fabrication, are ultimately unreliable.”).
252. See supra notes 192–206 and accompanying text (discussing Tienda).
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Certainly, it is possible that others will post maliciously on a page to
which they gain unfair access.  Where others regularly have access, such as
a joint email account or a Facebook page to which the owner has shared
the password, it is certainly credible that someone could have maliciously
posted to damage another’s reputation or chances in litigation.  For in-
stance, a married couple might share a social networking page.  If they di-
vorce, one could easily believe that one spouse could make damaging posts
facially attributable to the soon-to-be ex-spouse.253  Even that situation,
however, should not automatically bar authentication.  Instead, the court
should weigh various factors and, in general, leave it to the finder of fact to
assess the likelihood that the postings are fraudulent.
Some fact patterns do indeed demand a finding by the court that the
posting is inauthentic.  When a page owner can demonstrate that she was
locked out of her Facebook account on the relevant dates postings were
made and that she complained to the provider that her access was cut off,
that constitutes grounds for rejecting the authenticity of the post.  Simi-
larly, if a post is taken down, the password is changed, and the person im-
mediately disavows the posting as soon as she regains use of the site, the
judge should probably reject the post as inauthentic.  Remarkably, many of
those denying that they made a post on their social network pages never
bothered to take it down until after it presented legal trouble.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
So much modern communication already transpires over new media
such as Facebook that lawyers and judges must find reliable and inexpen-
sive ways to accommodate the huge volumes of information and potential
courtroom evidence these sites generate.  On the hearsay front, there has
been little problem adapting to the forms of communication.  With some
added limits to the present sense impression exception254 (an exception
that, along with excited utterance, tends to be overused anyway), the by-
zantine hearsay structure works well, and no courts struggle with it.
Issues of authentication, however, have caused much more confu-
sion—perhaps because one must have a basic understanding of the technol-
ogy to grapple with authenticity issues.255  The hyper-wariness of
authenticating social media pages displayed by some courts is bad policy
that will appear quaint one day but is impeding litigation now.  Because
social networking has become ubiquitous and may soon be the primary
means of communication for many, the stingy approach to authentication
253. Ilana Gershon, an anthropologist who studies breakups via new social media and the author
of BREAKUP 2.0, recounted to me that she came across a case where a wife, on an jointly held email
account, posted mean-spirited remarks about her herself and threats to her new boyfriend to make her
soon-to-be-ex-husband look vengeful and imbalanced.
254. See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Bellin’s suggestions re-
garding present sense impressions and Twitter).
255. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 538 (D. Md. 2007) (recognizing that au-
thenticating electronically stored information presents a myriad of concerns because “technology
changes so rapidly” and is “often new to many judges.”).
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will lead to the unnecessary loss of valuable evidence.256  Fear of the tech-
nology has led some courts to demand unreasonable levels of assurance of
genuineness, ignoring that judges’ initial screens for authenticity should not
present a high hurdle to admissibility.  True, Facebook pages can be faked.
So can written documents.
Some scholars believe that the complexity and novelty of the new so-
cial media “requires greater scrutiny of ‘the foundational requirements’
than letters or other paper records, to bolster reliability.”257  I, however,
agree with the court in In re F.P.,258 which rejected the notion that elec-
tronic communication is “inherently unreliable.”259  The court did not sup-
port challenges to authentication, stating that “[e]ssentially, appellant
would have us create a whole new body of law just to deal with e-mails or
instant messages.”260  The court acknowledged the possibility that the diffi-
culty of tracing electronic communication to a specific author can create
some uncertainty and that “anybody with the right password can gain ac-
cess to another’s e-mail account and send a message ostensibly from that
person.”261  It continued to observe, however, that “the same uncertainties
exist with traditional written documents.  A signature can be forged; a let-
ter can be typed on another’s typewriter; distinct letterhead stationary can
be copied or stolen.”262  Historically, those sorts of questions are for the
finder-of-fact to sort out.263
Attorneys can make their own lives and courts’ determinations easier
if they follow some basic principles.  Attorneys wishing to authenticate a
Facebook page or some other form of social networking should:
1. Lay a foundation for the provenance of the printout of the social
media page in question.
a. The witness must describe where on the Internet the page was lo-
cated and how the witness downloaded it.264
b. The relevant page should be printed out with its URL visible.265
c. The witness should also be prepared to testify that the printout re-
flects accurately what the witness saw on the webpage.266
256. See Uncel, supra note 2, at 45–46 (criticizing courts’ “mistrust of social networking content
even in the midst of ample evidence that exists to support its authenticity.”).
257. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 543–44 (quoting JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 900.06[3] (2d ed.1997)).
258. 878 A.2d 91 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
259. Id. at 95.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See Uncel, supra note 2, at 66–69 (advocating a “presumption of authenticity”). But see
Robbins, supra note 8 (arguing for stricter standards).
264. If the page is still up (which is doubtful at the time of the testimony) the finder-of-fact could
access the page in the courtroom.
265. BROWNING, supra note 1, at 113.
266. Id.
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d. Some evidence should be offered as to who has access to the page
and how.267
2. Establish ownership of the page.  This can be accomplished by stipu-
lation, testimony of a person with knowledge (ideally, but not necessarily,
the page owner), an affidavit from the service provider about to whom the
page is registered, or circumstantial evidence.  In appropriate circum-
stances, particularly where the name, birth date, geographic location,
photo, and other identifying characteristics of the page owner are visible on
the page, ownership can be established by such distinctive criteria, along
with content-based evidence.  Allowing authentication based on the page
information alone is particularly appropriate when evidence is abundant
from the style and content of the page that the page owner regularly used
it.  It would be an expensive and unnecessary impediment to litigation if
courts routinely required affidavits from service providers.268
3. Demonstrate that the page owner actually wrote the post in ques-
tion.  This can best be accomplished by stipulation or questioning the page
owner or post writer.269  It can also sometimes be established by examining
the hard drive of the page owner’s computer, but that is expensive and
incomplete because Facebook pages and their ilk can be accessed from
many different devices anywhere there is an Internet connection.270  Even
if the owner of the page denies having written the post, circumstantial evi-
dence, such as the content of the post, can provide sufficient distinctive
characteristics for authentication and identification of the author.271
Where the page owner acknowledges ownership of the page but claims
hacking or other usurpation, evidence that the posting remained up while
the page was in the owner’s control would persuasively rebut claims of
hacking, etc.
Essentially, I recommend a rebuttable presumption of authenticity of
social media accounts whereby the offering party goes through the three
267. Commonwealth v. Purdy, 945 N.E.2d 372, 382 n.7 (Mass. 2011) (requiring some “testimony
regarding how secure a MySpace Web page is, who can access it, or whether codes are needed for such
access.”).
268. See Democko, supra note 1, at 403 (rejecting a suggestion to obtain information directly from
the social network provider as too expensive); Purdy, 945 N.E.2d at 382 n.7 (noting “that we do not
suggest that expert testimony or exclusive access is necessary to authenticate the authorship of an e-
mail.  Nor do we suggest that password protection is necessary to authenticate the authorship of an e-
mail, even though there was such protection here.”).
269. BROWNING, supra note 1, at 113 (“To make the process of proving authorship as simple and
direct as possible, consider asking the witness about his or her online social networking during a
deposition.”).
270. See Democko, supra note 1, at 403 (rejecting a proposal to examine the hard drive to deter-
mine the provenance of a Facebook past noting: “This option may be viable in theory, but impractical in
practice. Internet-communication devices and social networking sites can be accessed from any com-
puter, in any location, at any time, as long as the user’s username and password are supplied.”).
271. Cf. Dickens v. State, 927 A.2d 32 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007) (authenticating telephonic text
messages as having been sent by the defendant  based on the content and the circumstances of those
messages, including evidence of the timeline, references to other messages, and mention of the couple’s
wedding vows).
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steps above.272  I disagree both normatively and descriptively with Judge
Grimm, who states that “it is critical for courts to start demanding that
counsel give more in terms of authentication—and counsel who fail to
meet courts’ expectations will do so at their own peril.”273
Many courts have taken an appropriately liberal approach to authenti-
cation.274  The standard for authentication by the judge as a gatekeeper
should remain low.  The technology should not drive a demand for more
than the minimal showing that the evidence rules wisely require.
On the issue of page ownership, normally, subpoenaing the service
provider or examining the computer in question should not be necessary to
prove page ownership.275  In civil cases, questions of authenticity and ad-
missibility of documents should be hashed out in advance of trial.  If a
party refuses to stipulate as to page ownership, then resorting to a sub-
poena is appropriate, with the objecting party paying for the cost of discov-
ery if ownership is found.
In criminal cases, many prosecutors already use subpoenas and com-
puter experts, particularly in cases where the computer evidence is key
(such as cases involving solicitation of minors for sex on social media).276
In such cases, using subpoenas and experts makes the most sense strategi-
cally but should not be an absolute requirement.
In many cases, the accused objects that the prosecutor has not authen-
ticated a page but never actually denies that the social media is his own.
Such disingenuous and opportunistic objections undermine the function of
the evidence rules when there is enough other evidence to prove that the
item in question is what the prosecutor purports it to be.  Particularly
troubling is when the accused in a criminal case attempts to admit evidence
from a social network site and is met with a high bar for authentication.
272. Many courts employ such a rebuttable presumption in admitting emails. Cf. Midwest Retail-
ers Ass’n v. City of Toledo, 582 F. Supp. 2d 931, 934–35 (N.D. Ohio 2008); Mortgage Mkt. Guide,
L.L.C. v. Freedman Report, L.L.C., No. 06-CV-140, 2008 WL 2991570, at *12 n.3 (D.N.J. July 28, 2008);
Telewizja Polska USA, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., No. 02C3293, 2004 WL 2367740, at *6 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 15, 2004).
273. Paul W. Grimm et al., Back to the Future: Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Co. and
New Findings on the Admissibility of Electronically Stored Information, 42 AKRON L.REV. 357, 366
(2009).
274. See, e.g., State v. Bell, 882 N.E.2d 502, 511–12 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Jan. 29, 2008), aff’d, No.
CA2008–05–044, 2009-Ohio-2335, 2009 WL 1395857 (Ohio Ct. App. May 18, 2009) (denying authenti-
cation challenge despite the fact “that MySpace chats can be readily edited after the fact from a user’s
homepage. . . . [and] that while his name may appear on e-mails to T.W., the possibility that someone
else used his account to send the messages cannot be foreclosed.”).
275. See, e.g., Dockery v. Dockery, No. E2009-01059-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 3486662, at *6 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2009) (rejecting arguments that “the computer printouts of the conversations between
Husband and [ex-wife] could be authenticated only by a representative of MySpace”).
276. See, e.g., People v. Clevenstine, 891 N.Y.S.2d 511, 514 (App. Div. 2009) (“investigator from
the computer crime unit of the State Police related that he had retrieved such conversations from the
hard drive of the computer used by the victims, a legal compliance officer for MySpace explained that
the messages on the computer disk had been exchanged by users of accounts created by defendant and
the victims, and defendant’s wife recalled the sexually explicit conversations she viewed in defendant’s
MySpace account while on their computer. Such testimony provided ample authentication for admis-
sion of this evidence.”).
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Where there is a genuine objection that the page does not belong to the
putative owner, each side has equal access to subpoena power, and the
burden should not necessarily be on the proffering party to subpoena the
records.
On the issue of whether an impermissible post was made on a site that
the owner acknowledges as his, questions of authenticity should almost al-
ways be left for the finder-of-fact.  Unless the evidence of hacking or cap-
ture is irrefutable, questions as to who made an individual post should not
be solely determined by the trial court in its gatekeeping role.
